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FOREWORD
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have brought
to public attention a number of issues concerning the
role of the civilian leadership in the Department of
Defense (DoD) and the military. Although popular
writings have focused on the alleged failings of DoD
leadership from former Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld on down, there is a much longer running
dispute between the civilians and military in the Pentagon. This dispute centers on how money is allocated
across the Department and where funds should be invested. As we draw down in Iraq and look towards
setting Afghanistan on a sustainable path to stability
and self-governance, the DoD will have to contend
with a constricting fiscal environment, the need to recapitalize equipment, reset and reconstitute units, and
prepare for a future security environment that holds
many challenges for the United States, its partners,
and allies. To address these future challenges, the
Services will want to harness the latest technologies
and continue modernization and transformation, including examining requirements for next-generation
aircraft, ships, and land combat systems.
In this timely monograph, Mr. Quentin Hodgson
explores how the civilian and military leadership of the
Pentagon have debated and argued decisions on major
weapons programs. Drawing on interviews with participants and archival research, he has demonstrated
the enduring nature of these debates, despite efforts
to improve, transform, and overhaul the defense planning and programming system. Starting with the advent of the Department’s planning and programming
system under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
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in the 1960s, Mr. Hodgson traces the evolving debate
over the role of nuclear propulsion in surface ships for
the Navy, including the changing perspectives on the
roles of analysis versus military judgment. He highlights that these debates are not exclusive to one Service by examining the dialogue across administrations
between the Air Force and the political leadership
that culminated in the cancellation, and later resurrection, of the B-1 bomber. Finally, he looks at one of the
most prevalent and public debates of recent memory
between the Army and Secretary Rumsfeld over the
development of the Crusader artillery system. In each
case, he has rightly included the role of Congress as a
critical component.
Mr. Hodgson’s lessons learned in his conclusion
are a healthy reminder that miracle cures are unlikely
to resolve these sources of conflict, and in many respects these tensions are necessary and desirable when
the impacts of the decisions can be momentous. I commend his work to civilian and military leaders alike.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The development and procurement of major
weapons programs in the United States is a complex
and often drawn-out process complicated by political
considerations and often sharp disagreements over
requirements and the merits of systems. Secretaries of
Defense since Robert McNamara have sought to impose discipline on the process, with varying degrees
of success. Conflicts between a military service and the
civilian leadership are inevitable. A Service wants to
develop the most advanced system to address its perceived need, whereas the Secretary of Defense must
balance competing requirements across the Department of Defense. The military and the civilian leadership may also have different strategic perspectives
that feed this conflict. Through the detailed analysis
of three case studies—the Nuclear Surface Navy in the
1960s, the B-1 Bomber in the 1970s, and the Crusader
artillery system in the 2000s—the author explores
some of the common themes and sources of friction
that arise in civil-military relations concerning major
weapons programs. He concludes with some thoughts
on how the Secretary of Defense can anticipate and
reduce these sources of friction, while retaining an environment that supports healthy debate.
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DECIDING TO BUY:
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
AND MAJOR WEAPONS PROGRAMS
INTRODUCTION
The history of the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD), since its inception, is also the history of the development of capabilities necessary to control and implement strategy in the Department of Defense (DoD).
James Forrestal, who served as the first Secretary of
Defense (SecDef), recognized that the SecDef needed
more power to impose discipline on the military services. Since then OSD has sought to implement greater control while the Services have fought to maintain
their independence. The Defense Act of 1958 gave the
SecDef control over the allocation of resources among
the Services for the first time, effectively transforming
him from a mere arbiter into a decisionmaker. However, it was not until the SecDef decided to exercise
this new authority and implement the management
processes to facilitate it, that we saw the emergence of
the SecDef office as we recognize it today. Robert McNamara was not the first to have these powers, but he
served long enough, had the support of the President,
and also possessed enough willpower to grapple with
the issues while also attempting to impose discipline
in the process.
Civil-military relations have a rich tradition of
study in American scholarship.1 Samuel Huntington’s
seminal work, The Soldier and the State, serves as the
basis of modern scholarship on the subject, even for
those who challenge his theory of civil-military relations. One aspect of Huntington’s book is of particular
importance for this paper: Huntington pointed out the
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unique nature of the profession of arms and the expertise required in building and employing military
forces for the purposes of organized destruction;2 or,
as Harold Lasswell would call it, the “management
of violence.”3 The martial profession has developed
steadily over the course of history, but industrialization and increasingly technological means of destruction and killing have led to the profession of arms being characterized as much by technical expertise as by
Carl von Clausewitz’s coup d’oeil.4
This technological development has led to a growing need to fully understand the technology of war,
not just the passions of war. What are the soldiers’
tools, and how are they used? This is a critical question that militaries, particularly Western ones, have
wrestled with and to which they have often drawn
the wrong conclusions, but always moving forward
towards increasing destructiveness and ferocity. Soldiers no longer bring their weapons to battle from the
farmstead or the baronial estate; the state has taken
on the responsibility of arming and often caring for
and feeding the soldier, even in times of peace. In the
United States and various other nations, this has given
rise to vast bureaucracies responsible for creating a
budget for and managing such programs.
This model gives rise to inevitable conflicts when
ministries and departments run by civilians seek to
impose restrictions on the relatively high-cost military and aforementioned military programs. In some
cases, the same civilians have previously served in the
military, but often they have not.5 The latter group’s
understanding of the needs of the military varies
with each individual, but it, unfortunately, often conflicts with the military services’ perception of their
own needs. Though much scholarship has focused
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on times of apparent civil-military crisis—episodes
such as Truman’s firing of Douglas MacArthur during
the Korean War; the dereliction of duty of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff during the Vietnam War; and the public disagreements between Army Chief of Staff Eric
Shinseki and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz about the troop numbers required for the 2003
invasion of Iraq—this brand of conflict occurs during
times of peace as well, often with far-reaching impacts
that the various participants cannot even fathom at
the time the dispute takes place. Civil-military relations are about more than how to conduct oneself during war and decisions about going to war.
Defense strategy plays out in many arenas. Which
conflicts the military will engage in and the methods
it will employ during said conflicts are obviously
important aspects, as are the types of equipment the
military will need and how it will acquire the equipment. Visions of future warfare often differ, and can
be either near-psychic in nature or catastrophically
wrong, as the French discovered in World War II.6
What a military buys defines, in many respects, how
it fights. Thus the decision about which capabilities to
acquire is of supreme importance. It revolves not just
around whether or not to buy, but also how many, and
of what type. For example, by 1943 Soviet armored
units in World War II were organized around a limited number of vehicles (particularly the T-34 tank),
whereas German armored units often encompassed a
dozen types of armored vehicles of varying complexity.7
This paper’s central focus will be on three case
studies which will answer the question of how senior
civilian leaders in the DoD and the White House arrive at decisions on what to buy, and how they imple-

3

ment those decisions, particularly when the affected
military department has different opinions on what
should be bought. This paper does not seek to answer
the question of who is right and who is wrong, but
rather to look at how those charged with controlling
the military come into conflict with the military and
how they resolve issues related to the decisions that
affect the potential course of future conflicts.
These case studies are not intended to provide
universally applicable lessons, though there are remarkably consistent features in all of them. This is primarily an historical analysis (as opposed to a work of
political science) to delve deeply into the cases, identify the arguments on both sides, isolate the actors, and
explain the cases’ individual outcomes. From these
cases, some preliminary conclusions about the nature
of decisionmaking and of major weapons programs
will be drawn, which, it is hoped, will provide insight
into how to improve future approaches.
These case studies cover a relatively long period,
but demonstrate some constants, such as the role of
Congress, the conflict over information, and differing
levels of analysis. In some cases, one could easily use
a quotation from an actor in 2002 in the context of the
1960s, and it would not seem out of place.8 Care has
been taken to choose cases that have had an impact on
each of the three main military branches, the Army,
Navy, and Air Force, to show there are no particular
biases or peculiarities in the relations between any one
branch and the civilian leadership. The case studies
are also exemplifications of their time periods. It may
appear these cases have been chosen because they are
sensational examples, but the richest case studies often result from the greatest conflicts. The dynamics
were no different in the following studies than in oth-
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er cases, just a bit more conspicuous. The cases have
also been chosen because they occurred during both
Democratic and Republican administrations. This
should control for any biases which may result from a
particular party’s approach to civil-military relations.
Finally, the first two case studies occurred against
the backdrop of the Cold War. The last case study occurred at the outset of a newer conflict with a new
nature that we are still adjusting to at the time of this
writing (Spring 2009), but which has only had a marginal impact on the debate. There were irregular challenges in each of the three cases, against which the
government was forced to test the viability of whatever new weapon system was under consideration at
the time.
THE NUCLEAR NAVY
This analysis begins with the origins of the modern DoD system used for devising, analyzing, and
budgeting for military requirements. The first case
study highlights the difference in opinion between the
military branches and the senior civilian leadership
in DoD. On this occasion, the Navy took the position
that whatever could improve tactical and operational
capabilities was worthy of pursuit. However, in order
to deal with the civilian leadership, the SecDef in particular, in a seemingly more sophisticated, less emotive manner, the Navy gradually and grudgingly adopted a more rigorously analytical approach toward
deciding which capabilities were necessary. The following case study provides an excellent example of
how assumptions, perspective, costs, Congress, and
comparative arguments can each play a critical role in
determining what the DoD decides to buy and how it
arrives at said decisions.
5

Robert McNamara and the Advent of Systems
Analysis.
Robert Strange McNamara had barely been named
head of the Ford Corporation in 1960 when newly
elected President John F. Kennedy asked him to become the new SecDef. McNamara had served in the
Army Air Corps during World War II, mainly in the
Office of Statistical Control, and since the end of the
war he had been one of a group of “Whiz Kids”9 recruited into Ford Motor Corporation whose goal was
to help revive the company. He used his background
in systems analysis and business studies at Harvard to
bring a more active form of management to the DoD
in 1961.
Although the position of SecDef was less than 2 decades old at that point, McNamara already had eight
predecessors who had tried, with varying degrees of
success, to implement change and manage the vast
competing bureaucracies which made up the military-branch departments. Forrestal had vigorously
opposed the creation of the office when he was Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), but after a few months as
Truman’s SecDef, he realized the weak powers of the
office needed bolstering.10 Although the National Security Act of 1947 gave the SecDef nominal supremacy
in the department, it took several attempts to properly
rectify the shortcomings of the office. These attempts
included an amendment in 1949 that demoted the
Service secretaries from cabinet-level positions; and,
more importantly, the Defense Reorganization Act
of 1958, which strengthened the SecDef’s office and
created the position of Director of Defense Research
and Engineering (DDR&E), among other endeavors.
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SecDef Neil McElroy, the first beneficiary of the 1958
Act, did not have much time to fully implement the
measures for which the Act called, and he largely allowed the Services to continue to set priorities within
their respective budgets.11
McNamara recognized that the department needed new management tools to control the burgeoning
defense budget. As Alain Enthoven termed it, the
defense budget prior to the Kennedy administration
“was far from the vital policy instrument it should
have been. Rather than a mechanism for integrating
strategy, forces, and costs, it was essentially a bookkeeping device for dividing funds between services
and accounts and a blunt instrument for keeping a lid
on defense spending.”12 McNamara’s Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) of 1962 sought
to tie a program to clearly articulated strategic goals,
provide a means to examine alternatives, and establish clear criteria for judging the relative merits of
competing programs.13 The system was intended to
raise the decisionmaking on acquisitions and procurement to the highest levels, but also allow all the players in the process to see the costs over the long term
and balance those costs against military requirements.
Another forecasted benefit was PPBS’s transition from
a 1-year budget projection to a multiyear focus that
was intended to result in more specific discussions of
Out-Year Costs.14
The original 5-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) covered
10 major military programs (strategic forces, generalpurpose forces, intelligence and communications,
airlift and sealift, guard and reserve forces, research
and development, central supply and maintenance,
training and medical services, administration and
associated activities, and support to other nations)
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and showed an 8-year projection of forces alongside
a 5-year projection of costs and manpower.15 McNamara, Assistant Secretary of Defense Charlie Hitch,
and Director for Weapons Systems Analysis Enthoven
hoped to engage the military services in an open debate on future requirements. Although it did not seem
so at the time to many military officers, it was also designed to give the Service chiefs a greater say in the
budget. Prior to 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
not asked for their opinion on the budget; through the
Draft Presidential Memorandum on the defense budget, they were given an opportunity to comment.16
However, for the first time the SecDef and his civilian subordinates were also not just giving a top-line
budget to the military departments. They were pushing and prodding to understand the reasoning behind
the military’s choices and challenging the conclusions
the different branches came to, particularly by challenging the oft-unspoken assumptions upon which
decisions were made. Enthoven wrote in his seminal
work, How Much is Enough, that analysis relies critically on assumptions, and since assumptions can be challenged, analysis should never be accepted as universally “correct.”17 This belief was too much for officers
who believed the military, by virtue of its operational
experience, had the monopoly on the correct answers.
General Thomas D. White, former Air Force Chief of
Staff made the point clearly in 1963 when he said:
In common with many other military men, active and
retired, I am profoundly apprehensive of the pipesmoking, tree-full-of-owls type of so-called professional ‘defense intellectuals’ who have been brought
into this nation’s capitol. I don’t believe a lot of these
often over-confident, sometimes arrogant young professors, mathematicians and other theorists have suffi-
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cient worldliness or motivation to stand up to the kind
of enemy we face.18

Vice Admiral Hyman Rickover was also a critic of
civilian force planners, and, in May 1968, called them
all “spiritualists” and “sociologists” and accused them
of “playing at God while neglecting the responsibility
of being human.”19 Naturally, any change to the status
quo stimulates opposition, but in this case the source
of the conflict was deeper. The civilian analysts were
challenging the heretofore uncontested military domination over defense investment choices.
McNamara’s First Budget Moves.
Every new administration faces a daunting task
when it first arrives in office: adjusting priorities in
the budget. The incoming administration will work
for almost its entire first year under a budget that was
developed and submitted by the outgoing administration and passed by the previous year’s Congress.
The first elements of change in the budget only come
with a revised submission of the budget for the fiscal
year, which starts on October 1 of the administration’s
first year. Although a presidential candidate will have
made numerous pledges during the campaign regarding spending priorities and programs, he is still faced
with combing through a massive budget submission
to implement any changes once he makes it into office. McNamara decided to tackle the problem by examining the big programs in the budget and creating
a draft memorandum for the President outlining his
recommendations for changes to the budget.20
Assistant Secretary of Defense Hitch distributed a
top secret memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early
February along with a draft of the memo McNamara
9

intended to send to the President in late February. In
the memo, McNamara noted that he had reviewed the
Dwight Eisenhower administration’s Fiscal Year (FY)
1961 and FY 1962 budgets based on his understanding
of each year’s national security objectives, and with
the help and advice of Secretary of State Dean Rusk
and other members of the White House staff.21 He
noted further that:
The task of thinking through the implications of national security objectives for military force structure is
a tremendously complex and necessarily a continuing
one. This review of the current budget has been able
to deal with only the most urgent and obvious problems. Existing analyses on some of the central issues of
general nuclear war made it possible to penetrate most
deeply into this area. However, here, as with limited
war, much more study is required, and will be undertaken as a matter of urgency before the FY 1963 budget
is presented.22

Two major components of the message, the issue of
nuclear propulsion for the Navy and the B-70 bomber,
will be addressed below.
By 1961, the Navy had demonstrated the ability to provide nuclear propulsion in submarines. The
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which jointly
controlled the development of nuclear reactors along
with the DoD, was constantly looking for new opportunities to push the use of nuclear power. In its task,
the AEC was aided by Admiral Hyman Rickover, recognized by many as the father of the nuclear navy.
The problem was that nuclear-powered ships were
extremely expensive to build. USS Enterprise was the
first nuclear-powered carrier; it was commissioned in
November 1961 at a cost of nearly $500 million dollars, but it had not demonstrated full capabilities yet.23
10

The question also remained about how far to extend nuclear propulsion. An aircraft carrier does not
travel alone but in a task force with support ships and
other capital ships. Because of this, would all the ships
in the task force need to be nuclear-powered for the
military to take advantage of the full benefits of nuclear propulsion? In such a case, the costs would be staggering.24 A nuclear-powered submarine had obvious
advantages over its conventionally-powered cousins.
It could stay submerged for much longer periods of
time, was quieter while running its engines, and was
faster than any diesel-powered submarine. Surface
ships, on the other hand, were more costly to build,
man, operate, and maintain than oil-powered ships.25
Whether these costs were justified by increased performance would remain a hotly contested issue for
much of the 1960s.
Initially the Navy was not a fierce advocate of nuclear propulsion for surface ships, though there was
an interest in seeing how much, if at all, it could benefit the Navy. Admiral Arleigh Burke, who served as
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) from 1955 to 1961,
revealed his vision of a Navy consisting of 927 ships,
with 6 all-nuclear carrier task forces, by the beginning
of the 1970s. But even he recognized that rising costs
could kill his dreams of such a fleet while they were
still on the drawing board.26 In 1960, Secretary of the
Navy Thomas S. Gates testified before Congress that
the Navy was requesting authorization and funding
to build a non-nuclear-powered carrier because the increased costs of nuclear propulsion would not be offset, in his opinion, by increased steaming capacity.27
After the construction of the first nuclear carrier, the
Navy was unsure it wanted to proceed with a second
one until as late as 1962.28
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McNamara was inclined to agree with former Secretary of the Navy Gates. He was primarily concerned
with the costs of providing fully nuclear task forces.
Although the main debate in the first Kennedy budget centered on the carrier (designated CVA-67), the
costs associated with the accompanying ships played
a large role as well. Admiral Burke’s vision for the
end of the decade had involved a task force with an
aircraft carrier, two guided missile cruisers, and three
frigates, all with nuclear propulsion.29
McNamara’s advisors looked at several alternatives for nuclear propulsion and its role in the surface navy, including the possibility of completely
converting all the carriers, cruisers, and frigates—the
main components of an attack carrier task force—to
nuclear power. They conceded that “tactical flexibility is considerably enhanced by nuclear propulsion,”30
especially since it removed the need to conserve fuel.
They estimated that a carrier steaming at 20 knots had
a designed endurance of 8,000 miles (which would be
just enough to steam from Hawaii to the China Sea
and back) with conventional power, but could reach
an astounding 475,000 miles with nuclear power. A
carrier by itself could maintain high rates of speed for
extended periods of time in order to get to the area
of operations quickly, but it would still need support
ships that could keep up with it.31
The nuclear-powered cruisers and frigates did not
quite have the designed endurance of the carriers, but
the frigates were quite close. OSD analysts noted that
these advantages dissipated if not all the support ships
were nuclear-powered, and that the ships would still
be needed to resupply the carriers with food, aviation
fuel, and ammunition, among other things. However,
larger ships, generally nuclear-powered vessels, did
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not afford significantly more storage space to stock
more of these supplies. On the other hand, a conventionally-powered carrier’s endurance was roughly
equal to its utilization rate for other supplies in a cold
war environment.32 In other words, it had enough fuel
to last, in most cases, until such time that even a nuclear-powered carrier would have to take on supplies
anyway.
Given these limitations, it seemed that the relative
cost difference between conventional and nuclearpowered systems seemed to favor those who were
against switching to nuclear power. However, OSD
analysts noted that building three aircraft carriers and
nine frigates with nuclear power would add $642 million to the 5-Year Defense Program, enough money
to add another two conventional carriers, or seven
guided missile frigates (DLG), and operate them for
20 years.33 The analysts stated that, in some cases, having ships use nuclear power to get to various hot spots
around the world was a desirable prospect, but they
also recommended against outfitting more than one
carrier group with nuclear-powered propulsion at the
time, given constraints on the budget in other areas.
Introducing the Planning, Programming, Budgeting
System.
The FY63 budget was the first full budget to institute the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS).34 Prior to the implementation of PPBS,
the different military branches had constructed their
budgets independently, with little interference from
the SecDef or the Bureau of Budget (now the Office of
Management and Budget [OMB]), except to abide by
the budget ceilings set by those offices. With the pre-
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vious budget system, each branch was able to build
its budget based on its own needs, but they usually
did so without regard for the capabilities of the other
branches. Former Army Chief of Staff General Maxwell Taylor summarized the issue in his congressional
testimony in 1960:
In spite of the fact that modern war is no longer fought
in terms of separate Army, Navy, and Air Force, nonetheless we still budget vertically in these service terms.
Yet, if we are called upon to fight, we will not be interested in the services as such. We will be interested
rather in task forces, these combinations of Army,
Navy, and Air Force which are functional in nature,
such as the atomic retaliatory forces, overseas deployments, continental air defense forces, limited war expeditionary forces, and the like. But the point is that
we do not keep our budget in these terms. Hence it is
not an exaggeration to say that we do not know what
kind and how much defense we are buying with any
specific budget.35

McNamara planned to amend this situation and, in
accordance with his charges from President Kennedy,
procure the best force possible at the lowest possible
cost. Hitch and Enthoven, among others, thought it
would be too ambitious to implement the PPBS changes all at once, and proposed starting only with strategic forces in the FY63 budget. McNamara insisted on
applying the system to the entire defense program “in
less than a year.”36 The main focus of PPBS was to provide decisionmakers in the Pentagon with continuous
updates and input during the entire budget—and defense program—building process, instead of the typical once-a-year inputs they gave as the budget came
together. The budget was broken into sections, each
detailing a certain major project. This gave the SecDef
14

and others a broader view of capabilities development
and how costs might build up or otherwise change
over an extended period of time. This allowed for the
examination of program choices at several points during their development, starting with their inception,
and took away the need to wait for milestones further
on in the developmental process.37
The FY63 budget also led to the initiation of a series
of cost-effectiveness studies, which examined the capabilities of both proposed and established programs
and compared them to one another based on their
cost. This new system required the military to provide
much more cost data than previously, and challenged
their domination of systems expertise.38 Despite the
quick pace at which McNamara wished to implement
the new system, Hitch was pleasantly surprised at the
quality of data and analysis he received from the Services. Although some submissions, such as those from
the general purpose forces, described the weapon systems and forces themselves rather than their effectiveness or potential effectiveness, the military branches
as a whole adapted well to the changes.39
The FY64 Budget—Moving Forward on Nuclear
Propulsion.
In the FY64 budget, which Hitch began constructing in the summer of 1962, McNamara requested that
one naval task force be outfitted with nuclear-powered
propulsion, but also called for the suspension of further nuclear shipbuilding while the costs and benefits
of the nuclear-powered task force were reviewed.40
The reviews were not based on cost alone, however.
McNamara was concerned about the development of
the Typhon frigate and its associated air defense sys-
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tem. The nuclear-powered Typhon (guided missilenuclear [DLGN]) was a new frigate which provided
greater defense for its fleet than previous models by
combining missiles and an advanced radar system. In
the FY64 budget, McNamara requested just one Typhon
frigate with nuclear propulsion; he requested that any
other frigates purchased be powered with conventional propulsion. He stated that further development
of the nuclear guided missile frigate could continue
in 1965. However, the purchase of the DLGN, which
was supposed to take place in 1963, was pushed back
2 years while the funds originally designated for this
were put toward other systems—more specifically,
the Tartar, Terrier, and Talos air defense missile systems—which were already under construction.
Around the same time, McNamara testified
that the destroyer force would shrink dramatically
throughout the decade, and decline from the 207 ships
it held in 1963 to 120 in 1971. He also determined that
the guided missile escort ship (DEG) had “priced itself
out of the program,”41 since a DEG was estimated to
cost $11 million more than a regular destroyer escort,
over 25 percent more expensive.42 This fact shows that
McNamara’s decisions about which capabilities to acquire were consistently based on price, as well as the
capability’s potential long-term value.
During the fall of 1962, there was much debate over
possible revisions for the Navy shipbuilding program.
In late October, Hitch prepared a draft of the memorandum for the President, which was then distributed
for internal departmental review. The Navy wanted
to maintain a sizable fleet of 852 ships and create a
fairly large new-construction program that would
last through the end of the decade. McNamara, on the
other hand, believed it should buy fewer new ships—
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he wanted to purchase 249 between FY63 and FY68,
while the Navy had originally requested 322—and
convert some of the old ships to make up part of the
difference. Even with a larger number of conversions
than primarily planned (94, as opposed to the Navy’s
initial request for 67), McNamara’s program would
yield 46 fewer new and converted ships at the end of
the program period.43 However, this was also more
than he had sought in the previous year’s budget.44
Based on the preliminary Navy analysis, Congress
was primed to expect a much larger number of ships
required than the number it officially received later.
The Navy had told Congress earlier in 1962 that full
modernization of the fleet by FY 1973 would require
366 new construction ships and 67 conversions in
FY64-68, but later analysis showed that 68 of the ships
that the Navy originally planned to replace could stay
through the mid-1970s. As such, the Navy ended up
scaling back the number of ships in its official request
based on this analysis, but added a shipbuilding program in the FY63 budget, as well as a program McNamara deemed “highly tentative” because he had not
had sufficient time to conduct a detailed analysis of it
yet. Even so, McNamara approved the budget.
McNamara noted in his later testimony on the
shipbuilding program, “with regard to fleet obsolescence, there has been a tendency to focus attention on
the wrong set of facts. What we should be concerned
with is not the chronological age of a particular ship,
but whether it is able to perform its mission in the face
of the expected threat, that is, whether it is tactically
obsolescent.” He went on to state his belief that “we
are now all in agreement in the Pentagon that obsolescence based on age alone is not a useful concept.”45 In
these comments, McNamara conveyed his belief that
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the Navy’s budgetary appetite needed to be more controlled.
The Navy hardly agreed with McNamara, arguing
in its November 9, 1962, memorandum to the SecDef
that the fleet faced “block obsolescence” and that fully
effective ships should comprise the force structure.46
The memorandum for the President, which was truly
aimed more at the DoD than the President himself,
was McNamara’s tool for explaining his view and trying to convince, or perhaps bludgeon, his opponents
into submission. In a number of cases, he recommended putting off the construction of new ships meant to
replace ships that had been in the fleet for years, since
he was already dealing with the retirement of many
World War II-era ships, and he wanted to avoid adding to his fiscal burden if at all possible. He was also
wary of the apparent rush to field the new nuclearpowered ships, which, thus far, were still underdeveloped or untested technologies, hence his hesitation to
support the Navy’s request for four nuclear-powered
Typhon destroyers (guided missile-nuclear destroyer
[DDGN]). The Navy had requested a total of nine Typhon DDGNs over the FY65-68 time frame,47 but the
Typhon missile system had not been fully developed
yet. Additionally, McNamara was awaiting a more
concrete understanding of the capabilities of a singlereactor nuclear propulsion system, given that Enterprise had eight reactor plants, and no surface ship had
yet put to sea with only one reactor.
The Navy asked for a nuclear-powered, missile-enabled frigate, the Terrier class, in the FY63 shipbuilding program, and for conventionally-powered Typhon
frigates in FY64 through FY67. The Navy planned
to set enough funding aside to construct one Typhon
each year, except in FY66, in which it planned to build
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two.48 In a November 1962 memo to McNamara, Hitch
recommended going a less ambitious route and waiting to build the one nuclear-powered frigate in FY65
as previously planned, but he also offered McNamara
some possible alternatives. One option involved constructing a conventionally-powered Terrier DLG in
FY63 using the $70.5 million savings that would result
in improved Terrier, Tartar, and Talos missile systems;
this would increase the FY64 budget for shipbuilding
by $25 million and roughly even out the costs over the
next 4 years. A second option involved building the
ship foreseen for FY67 in FY66, but the Navy would
not be granted any of its other requests. Finally, the
third option involved adding another Typhon to the
program in FY66, while also granting the Navy’s full
request for six DLG frigates, but these requests would
not be met according to the Navy’s original schedule.
In the margins of his copy of the memo, McNamara
noted that the third alternative “would be my preference.”49
The Navy’s approach to gaining the nuclear-powered ships it wanted, when it wanted them, was interesting, to say the least. In October 1962, when OSD
announced the cancellation of the Terrier-class frigate
in FY63, and planned use of the nuclear-powered Typhon in FY65 in its place, the Navy submitted a “reclama” which aimed to pocket the Typhon and reinstate
the Terrier-class frigate for the time being; despite the
original Navy request for only one of the two ships, it
now wanted both. The Navy argued that the preliminary OSD numbers would take the fleet from 852 to
828 total ships, below a comfortable level of total force
structure effectiveness. Additionally, the Navy wanted a full nuclear-powered task force to go along with
the FY63 guided-missile frigate, despite admitting that
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“the AAW [anti-aircraft warfare] capability of Terrier
is . . . less than that expected of Typhon.”50 The Navy
then stated that, as a result of this fact, waiting 2 years
for the Typhon “would both lessen the effectiveness of
the nuclear task force and unduly retard the further
refinement of surface ship nuclear propulsion.”51 Finally, the Navy reminded the Secretary that Congress
was expecting a nuclear-powered frigate in the FY63
budget.52 Their approach to getting what they wanted
was certainly not a subtle one.
The cost differential between the nuclear-propelled
and conventionally-propelled ships was not insignificant. The FY63, nuclear-powered Typhon-class frigate
would cost $190 million, while its conventionallypowered equivalent would cost 35 percent less, at only
$123 million each. It is important to note that decisions
over what capabilities to acquire were based primarily on the procurement cost, not total life-cycle cost.
In the program reviews, the Navy argued that “as a
result of a re-evaluation of the DLG [Typhon] program,
the approved program has been decreased from 8 to 5
in recognition of the introduction of a guided missile
single nuclear reactor destroyer (DDG(N)(TYPHON)
which will provide a considerable increase in endurance and tactical flexibility.”53 It is unclear whether the
Navy provided any additional analysis on the substance of this increased flexibility, but we know from
McNamara’s side of the debate over the FY63 aircraft
carrier (the CVA-67) that he was dissatisfied with the
Navy’s supposed analysis of the increased flexibility
and negligible cost differences.54
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Marking Time—The FY65 Budget.
In 1963, McNamara sought to mark time on the
nuclear propulsion question. He testified before the
House Armed Services Committee on January 27,
1964, just 2 months after Kennedy’s assassination, on
the FY65 budget and 1965-69 defense program. This
was his third full year working on the defense program—certainly enough time to feel comfortable with
the budgeting process and to have begun to address
major strategic issues. Despite this fact, he continued
to call for more study of nuclear propulsion in surface
warships. He ascribed the problems facing a nuclear
navy to the development of more efficient and lighter
reactors. Given the size and weight of the existing nuclear power sources, a nuclear-propelled ship generally had to be larger than its conventionally-powered
counterparts, since the nuclear power source was
heavier than conventional sources when their respective ships were using the same amount of horsepower.55 This being the case, he used extreme caution and
continued to advocate for further research and development on the nuclear reactors intended for surface
ships. There was also the fact that if he had more time
for research and testing, he would also have more
time to explore the cost versus effectiveness of various
capabilities.56
Overall, McNamara was not hostile towards the
prospect of nuclear propulsion. In the 1965 budget, the
defense program mentioned longingly an attack submarine fleet that could have half its boats, including
six new nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) powered
by nuclear reactors by the end of the decade.57 McNamara announced his conclusion, however, that the
Typhon frigates were proving too complex, expensive,
and large to be a viable capability. Only one of these
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frigates was intended to have nuclear propulsion, so
McNamara’s decision is not likely to have been based
purely on that issue.58 The Navy was still concerned
with providing fleet defense, and ended up requesting
more money for converting another 15 multipurpose
ships to Tartar DLGs, and for providing five converted
destroyers with newer radar systems.59
The CVA-67 Carrier—The Push for
Reconsideration.
Clearly, nuclear propulsion was not just a question
of nuclear carriers. And yet, the debate over whether
the next carrier would use nuclear or conventional
propulsion has remained more firmly embedded in
the historical record.60 This section will focus specifically on the tug-of-war over the fate of the FY63 carrier (CVA-67) between McNamara on the one hand
and the combined efforts of Admiral Rickover, the
Navy, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) on
the other.
CVA-67 had been authorized as a conventionallypowered aircraft carrier, but Admiral Rickover was
determined to revisit the issue to expand the reach of
nuclear propulsion.61 He was optimistic that the AEC
and the Navy could address the problem of expense
and mass of nuclear power plants with a newly designed four-reactor plant called the A3W. The new
plant could fit in the same space as the propulsion
system for the CVA-67. In December 1962, Rickover
asked the Navy’s shipbuilding bureau to examine how
to install the A3W plant in the CVA-67. The bureau’s
ship design division obliged with a determination that
the A3W plant would work in the carrier, but would
require significant redesign work to accommodate the
necessary changes in the propulsion system.62
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Admiral John “Chick” Hayward, Deputy CNO
for Development before taking command of the Enterprise carrier group in 1962, was recruited by Navy
Secretary Fred Korth to give an operator’s backing to
nuclear propulsion.63 Hayward’s January 2, 1963, letter conveyed his belief that USS Enterprise had performed far better than its conventional counterparts in
the operations around Cuba during the missile crisis.
He subsequently sent Korth a letter in September, urging nuclear propulsion for the next carrier.64 His approach was typical of many officers who discounted
cost-based arguments in favor of exploiting the latest technologies to ensure future operational victory.
Hayward said that a conventional carrier could fight
for 3 1/2 days with its onboard provisions of munitions; Enterprise could fight for a week, emphasizing
his argument by saying, “we should build fighting
ships, not floating hotels.”65 In his memoir, however,
Hayward admitted numerous problems, including
with maintaining the propulsion system and failures
of the Talos, Terrier, and Tartar missile systems during
President Kennedy’s visit and the subsequent cruise
to the Mediterranean.66
Rickover next sought the backing of the AEC,
pointing out that continued development of power
reactor technology was a good in itself, as well as having benefits in military operations. Glenn Seaborg,
the AEC chairman, wrote to McNamara on January
7, 1963, seeking his support for a four-reactor plant in
the carrier. Reportedly, Harold Brown in DDR&E and
Charlie Hitch were also supportive of the switch, in
addition to most of the Navy.67 Secretary Korth added
his weight to the argument in a January 23 letter to
McNamara in which he reviewed the advantages of
nuclear propulsion and the need to maintain a pro-
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gram that kept the momentum going for developing
the technology.68
McNamara was unconvinced that simple technology development was sufficient to justify the expense
of converting the CVA-67 to nuclear propulsion. He
wanted the Navy to provide more detailed analysis
of the role of nuclear propulsion, based on rigorous
number-crunching, not vague claims of operational
effectiveness. He asked for a study that would examine how nuclear power would affect the carrier task
force’s composition, defensive tactics, use of supply
ships, and number of task forces required. He also
wanted to know how the Navy proposed to manage
the transition to nuclear power given the natural disruptions a completely new model would have as the
force structure changed over time.69
The study McNamara wanted would take the
Navy past the deadline to bid out the construction of
the new carrier. The Bureau of Ships was given the
task to proceed with drafting a design for nuclear
propulsion, in addition to the oil-fired power plant already in hand. The Navy sent forward to McNamara
as much analysis as it could muster by early April,
which included Secretary Korth and Chief of Naval
Operations Admiral George Anderson’s stated belief
that all capital ships of 8,000 tons or more should be
nuclear-powered, phasing in construction over the
next few years.70
McNamara rejected the Navy’s analysis as insufficient to address his concerns and justify adding
more than $600 million to the shipbuilding program
over the next 5 years. In an April 20 memorandum,
McNamara emphasized a point that would come up
repeatedly when debating the merits of various military programs:
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[The] problem is this: Of course nuclear-powered ships
are better than conventional ships, costs not considered. But cost has to be considered because it is a measure of what is being given up elsewhere—elsewhere
in the Navy, the Department of Defense, the Federal
Government, and the economy as a whole . . . I need to
know whether nuclear power for surface warships is a
sensible expenditure as part of any budget, or whether
your proposal merely makes sense if the implied reductions in other capabilities are neglected.71

The Navy spent the summer months gathering
more data and marshalling further arguments in favor of nuclear propulsion. In late September, Korth
came back to McNamara with the Navy’s concerted
opinion that nuclear propulsion provided required
advantages in virtually unlimited endurance at high
speeds, increased tactical flexibility, the ability to operate in bad weather, or steam around bad weather in
ways that a conventional ship would be hard-pressed
to do without adequate resupply, the ability to extend
the attack across a greater arc, reduced vulnerability
stemming from resupply while under threat of attack,
and reduced logistical dependence. As for the number
of carrier task forces, Secretary Korth asserted that the
replacement ratio of nuclear carriers for conventional
was five to six, that is, increased combat effectiveness
would require one fewer carrier task force for the
same result. McNamara was not convinced, but did
not close off future nuclear propulsion. He took the
Navy analysis to show that the authorized conventional carrier would not reduce effectiveness and directed proceeding with the program as authorized.72
McNamara sent Korth a memorandum on October
9 that noted the Navy had yet to complete the analysis
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he had requested on the advantages of nuclear propulsion, but stated nonetheless:
On the basis of the analysis available to date, I am not
convinced that a net advantage is in prospect. While it
is clear that nuclear propulsion would result in some
desirable characteristics, the increased cost (particularly in ship construction) remains a serious disadvantage. . . . As a result, I believe the fiscal year 1963 carrier should proceed on the conventionally-powered
basis as authorized by Congress. I would like you to
take the proper steps to proceed with the construction
as soon as possible.73

McNamara’s decision on the carrier did not end
with his October 9, 1963, memorandum to Secretary
Korth. Rickover and his compatriots would mobilize
the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
to seek to overturn the decision. The committee’s chair,
Rhode Island Democrat Senator John Pastore, wrote
to McNamara on October 9 to request clarification of
the rumors he had heard on the decision to go with
a conventional carrier and announced his decision to
hold hearings on the topic. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric responded to Pastore on October 11 that no decision had been made yet, although
internal to the Pentagon, it was clear that McNamara
had done just that.74 Korth had appealed the decision
prior to Gilpatric’s letter to Pastore, but it was not until October 25, 5 days prior to the announced hearings,
that McNamara reiterated his decision and informed
Congress.75
The Navy and the AEC dominated the hearings
on October 30. Secretary Korth testified alongside
the new CNO, Admiral David McDonald, Rickover,
Vice Admiral Vincent De Poix (the first commander
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of Enterprise), Rear Admiral Hayward, and others.
Seaborg represented the AEC, along with several staff
members. The lone OSD witness was DDR&E head
Brown; McNamara was in Saigon and would testify in
mid-November.76 The committee members were distressed that McNamara had made his decision before
the hearings could take place. Even Brown admitted
that he had originally supported nuclear propulsion
in CVA-67, but also thought more analysis would be
needed to back up his inclinations.77 When McNamara
testified 2 weeks later on November 13, he emphasized that Congress had already authorized the carrier
as a conventional ship. He was not opposed to nuclear
propulsion, but felt Congress had already made its determination the previous year.78
The Joint Committee issued its findings early in
the New Year, advocating on behalf of nuclear propulsion for CVA-67 and all future first line surface
combatants. The committee concluded that “it is an
indisputable, demonstrated fact that nuclear propulsion increases the combat effectiveness of our surface
warships.”79 McNamara certainly did not dispute this,
but the Committee went on to declare that “increased
costs attributable to nuclear power are minor.”80 The
committee, however, did not have direct jurisdiction
over shipbuilding for the Navy, meaning that others
would have to carry the banner. Despite a dozen bills
in 1964 advocating nuclear propulsion, none passed.81
The Two-Reactor Power Plant.
After Kennedy’s assassination, several key players in the nuclear navy story changed. Secretary Korth
resigned and was replaced by Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze.
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Admiral David McDonald had replaced Anderson
(who only served one term) as CNO. The AEC continued to lobby McNamara, including hosting him at
the Bettis Atomic Laboratory in Mifflin, Pennsylvania,
outside of Pittsburgh. McNamara’s visit had a result
Seaborg, Rickover, and the other commissioners did
not intend. He showed great enthusiasm for the work
the laboratory was doing on the D1W two-reactor
plant. His enthusiasm stemmed from the reduced
weight, cost, components, and personnel involved
in building and operating the plant, though it would
complicate power requirements on a ship where the
reactor would provide energy for propulsion and
flight-deck operations.82
Rickover was not thrilled by the enthusiasm McNamara showed for a two-reactor program, in part
because the deadlines to get the FY63 carrier started
were passing, as were the decision points for the carriers planned for starts in FY65 and FY67. The next
carrier after CVA-67, originally scheduled for FY65,
had now slipped its schedule by 2 years. The Navy
could have a two-reactor power plant ready for the
FY67 ship, but it would be of smaller output than the
power-plant under development at Bettis, therefore
requiring a smaller carrier similar in size to a World
War II-era Essex class carrier. A reactor on the scale of
the D1W would probably have to wait beyond 1967.83
The Navy was not interested in such a small ship,
which could not carry the number of planes it thought
necessary.
Nitze by this point was convinced the Navy would
need 15 attack carriers and should fund a nuclearpowered vessel in each fiscal year beginning in 1967
through 1973. He also received assurances that the
larger two-reactor power-plant would be ready for a
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1967 vessel, if the decision was made quickly and funding assured. Nitze forwarded his recommendations
along these lines to McNamara in mid-July.84 McNamara was still not prepared to approve nuclear power
for all carriers, but he agreed that a request to the AEC
to proceed with developing a two-reactor power plant
would be prudent. He also sent Harold Brown to brief
the Joint Committee. According to Rickover and others present, Brown referred to the decision to proceed
with conventional power on USS John F. Kennedy (as
CVA-67 would now be called) by saying, “let’s face
it, Bob made a mistake.”85 It was not until late August
that McNamara, in response to a memorandum from
Charlie Hitch, approved nuclear propulsion for the
carriers scheduled to begin construction in 1967, 1969,
and 1971.86 But the Kennedy would remain a conventionally-powered carrier, largely due to the timing of
the decision more than anything else.
McNamara ultimately decided against nuclear
propulsion for CVA-67 on cost grounds, claiming that
it would cost $440 million compared to $280 million
for a conventional carrier. His analysis was not without its flaws. The Congressional Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy assailed the assumptions in McNamara’s analysis, pointing out that a nuclear carrier could
carry 50 percent more aviation fuel and ammunition than a conventional carrier. The Navy’s analysis
showed that the total life-cycle cost of a nuclear carrier
with its air wing over a 25-30 year lifespan is only 3
percent more than a conventional carrier.87
McNamara’s decision on CVA-67 did not close the
debate over nuclear propulsion, nor did McNamara
appear to want to do so. On the contrary, he wanted
to continue examining the issue and probing how best
to accommodate nuclear propulsion in the Navy’s

29

surface fleet. From the modern perspective, USS John
F. Kennedy appears to be a stutter-step along the path
to an all-nuclear carrier force.88 For much of its operational life, Kennedy would stand alone as a conventional carrier until its decommissioning in 2007.89 But
at the time, it was similar to other carriers in the fleet.
Of nearly 30 carriers at the time (including many of
World War II vintage), the nuclear-powered Enterprise
was in a class by itself.
McNamara Reverses Course—The FY67 Budget.
After winning the fight for a conventionally-powered carrier, McNamara was caught up in a series of
efforts to bring Service budgets into line and institute
managerial excellence. He also started to push what
we would call “Jointness” in weapons development,
including trying to force the Air Force and the Navy
to work together on a next-generation fighter aircraft,
rather than developing two separate aircraft. The TFX
program, which eventually became the F-111, was a
difficult program that occupied much of McNamara’s
time.90
In the FY1967 budget, McNamara reversed course
and requested three nuclear carriers to be built over
the next 5 years. He changed his mind in part due to an
analysis completed at the Center for Naval Analyses
by economist Patrick Parker showing that the costs of
a nuclear carrier over its lifetime were less than originally thought. Part of the disparity in cost estimates
stemmed from McNamara’s systems analysis office
assuming that a larger nuclear-powered aircraft carrier would carry an extra squadron of planes, which
over the 25 years of operations added $308 million to
the cost. This was fully two-thirds of the cost differen-
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tial between a conventional and nuclear-powered carrier. Since the Navy did not intend to put more planes
(at least it stated so at the time) on the carrier, these
costs were not accurate.91 Costs were also reduced by
using the new two-reactor cores that were expected to
last 13 years, or four times as long as the cores originally installed in Enterprise. The Navy had used systems analysis in essence to beat McNamara at his own
game. The Navy could now show in reasonable detail
and with sufficient sophistication in analysis that the
nuclear-powered carrier not only was more effective,
but also roughly equal in cost over its lifetime compared to conventional carriers.92
Another significant factor weighing on the decisionmaking at this point was the overwhelming
enthusiasm for nuclear propulsion developing in
Congress. In the words of one participant, “Congress
rammed the nuclear fleet down our throat, so I think
McNamara just acquiesced in that.”93
Conclusion.
Analysis played a large role in the decisionmaking over nuclear propulsion, signaling one of the first
attempts to use more than military judgment and arbitrary budget ceilings in the process. McNamara did
not dispute the operational effectiveness of nuclear
propulsion, but insisted on knowing more quantifiably the differences in capability and cost-effectiveness. Nuclear power may have brought an absolute
advantage to the tactical and operational employment
of the nuclear surface navy, but the relative advantages were what played the larger role in his mind.
The Navy wanted to pursue nuclear propulsion to
increase endurance, reduce logistics dependency, and
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provide speed to the fleet. It was not until the mid1960s that the Navy acquiesced to addressing comparative analyses with concrete data, rather than relying
on military judgment to carry the day. The Navy also
benefited from powerful congressional allies who saw
the need to continue pushing the technological envelope. This constant pressure would eventually wear
down McNamara’s resistance.
McNamara is often accused of pursuing cost as the
driving force behind his program decisions, and to a
certain extent he did. But this is not a complete picture.
His concern was about relative effectiveness, given a
limited budget. The absolute argument did not convince him; the subsequent analysis that demonstrated
much smaller cost differences for significantly greater
operational effectiveness convinced him to pursue nuclear propulsion. The Typhon missile system’s development difficulties underlined crucially the dangers
of pursuing technology too aggressively and trying to
push the deployment of immature and unproven systems. In the end, they would prove much more expensive and damaging to the overall budget than he was
willing to bear, for a failure of one system impacted
other programs and meant the Navy was unable to
fund them.
THE B-1 BOMBER
The next case study examines how changes in
requirements and the pursuit of unproven technologies can lead to increasing costs, elongated timelines,
and further conflict between civilian leaders and a
military service—the Air Force in this case. The B-1
bomber was part of a broader debate over the role of
the Service in supporting deterrence and in pursu-
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ing a program seemingly to the detriment of other,
equally promising technologies. Again, the differing
perspectives contributed to the difficulties arising
between the Secretary of Defense and the Service. As
the critical decision points approached, the assumptions underlying competing sets of analyses became
central to the conflict. In contradistinction to the previous case study, the civilian leadership decided to push
for newer technologies that showed greater promise,
whereas the Air Force seemed more bound to a more
traditional platform.
The Air Force of the 1960s was a bomber-centric
force. Several Air Force chiefs of staff, including Nathan Twining, Hoyt Vandenburg, and Curtis LeMay,
had been bomber pilots. So it is not surprising that a
major focus of the Air Force acquisition program in
the 1960s was a new manned bomber. This is not to
argue that simple ego or institutional bias led the Air
Force to focus on buying new bombers. By the time
President Carter made his decision to cancel the B-1
bomber in June 1977, numerous studies on replacing
the B-52—which was approaching 25 years of service
—had been undertaken, and several proposed platforms examined and canceled.94 Studies had examined the need for a new bomber, and the Air Force
had lost repeated battles, such as over the B-70, to find
a replacement for the B-52 and the few remaining B-58
bombers in the force.
Establishing the Requirement.
The B-52 production line closed in 1962, but the
shoot-down of U-2 pilot Gary Francis Powers in 1960
had the Air Force thinking about the preference for a
high-altitude, supersonic bomber supposedly beyond
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the reach of Soviet air defense missiles. The U-2 incident demonstrated improving Soviet capabilities in
this field, and the situation would likely continue to
worsen as the Soviets developed newer, more capable,
and longer-range missiles.95 The Air Force pursued a
series of studies to examine what the next generation
bomber might encompass, yielding an alphabet soup
of acronyms. First was the 1961 Subsonic Low Altitude Bomber (SLAB) project, followed by the Extended Range Strategic Aircraft (ERSA) and Low-Altitude
Manned Penetrator (LAMP) in 1963. In 1963 the Air
Force started two more studies called the Advanced
Manned Penetrator (AMP) and the Advanced Manned
Penetrating Strategic System (AMPSS). These studies concluded in 1965 and were followed by the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) in 1969.96
The studies tended to support the Air Force’s need
for a manned bomber, but McNamara, among others,
was not convinced of the need for a manned strategic
bomber.97 During this period, the Air Force had begun
development of one high-altitude supersonic bomber,
the B-70.
False Starts—The B-70 Bomber.
The B-70 program began in 1955 as the Air Force
looked beyond the shut down of the B-52 production
line to a next-generation bomber. At the same time,
missiles under development began to produce intercontinental ranges, meaning that the bomber was no
longer the sole means to deliver nuclear weapons on
targets in the Soviet Union. The B-70 was originally
envisioned as a first-strike platform, but underwent a
transformation in the late 1950s and early 1960s into
the RS-70, for reconnaissance strike. The idea now was
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that after missiles delivered a first strike, the RS-70
would follow on, identify those targets that had not
been destroyed the first time around, and hit them.98
The problem was that McNamara and his systems
analysts did not believe the RS-70 would actually
function in that capacity. It did not have the computing capacity on board, nor did they believe it could accurately conduct reconnaissance from such high altitudes to determine what targets needed to be hit. They
concluded that the Air Force would end up reverting
to using it in a bomber capacity—flying at high altitudes to penetrate Soviet air space and drop nuclear
bombs on pre-designated targets.99 In essence, it was
no better than a guided missile and provided none
of the traditional flexibility of other manned bombers.100 Given the conclusion that little distinguished it
from a missile, it had some drawbacks, such as requiring more time to reach targets than missiles (hours
compared to minutes) and was more vulnerable to
surprise attack, so it would have to be launched on
warning to preclude its destruction on the ground. It
also had poor penetrating capabilities: It could deal
with enemy interceptor aircraft, but not surface-to-air
missile defenses. Finally, the Systems Analysis studies showed that high-altitude flight was the wrong approach to defeating enemy air defenses; low-altitude
flight to come in under the radars promised better
penetrating capabilities.101
Based on this analysis and the projected $11-13 billion cost of fielding three wings of RS-70s, McNamara
was unwilling to support more than completing three
prototype aircraft. Notably, he estimated that the Air
Force had underbudgeted by nearly 50 percent the
cost of fielding the three wings that it wanted.102 He
stated in his testimony before Congress in 1963 that
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the marginal effectiveness of “mop-up” operations
conducted by the RS-70 with air-to-surface missiles as
opposed to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
did not justify the incredible cost.103 McNamara ultimately canceled the program in 1963, dispatching the
Air Force to rethink its bomber requirements.
The Air Force continued to examine its needs
throughout the decade, consistently concluding that a
next-generation manned bomber was a requirement.
The Air Force had two prototype XB-70 bombers that
had been built in 1964 with which it conducted flight
tests.104 Meanwhile, McNamara pushed the Navy and
the Air Force to build a new tactical aircraft together.
The TFX, which later became the F-111, was a program
fraught with difficulties, mainly because the Navy’s
requirements for a carrier-based aircraft conflicted
with the Air Force’s desire for a heavier aircraft with
“dash” speed greater than Mach 1.105 To accommodate
the Air Force’s bomber needs, McNamara settled on
a “stretch” version of the F-111, the FB-111. From the
Air Force’s perspective, however, the FB-111 lacked
the desirable range and payload for a true strategic
bomber.
After President Richard Nixon came to office in
1969, the new Pentagon leadership changed course
from McNamara’s. SecDef Melvin Laird and his
Deputy Secretary David Packard (of Hewlett-Packard
fame) encouraged the Air Force to proceed with a new
bomber program that would yield an aircraft boasting
an unrefueled range of 6,000 miles, top speed of Mach
2.2, flight ceiling of 50,000 feet, and a payload twice
that of the B-52.106
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Difficulties in Executing the B-1 Program.
The B-1 program, like many before and after it,
suffered from a number of setbacks during its development. The technology did not fully exist to meet
the requirements the Air Force set. Its main objective
was to produce a penetrating, supersonic aircraft that
could defeat projected Soviet air defense systems. A
large component of the debate centered around pushing the plane to higher altitudes to escape the range
of surface-to-air missiles, which would require supersonic cruising speeds, or very-low-altitude (less than
500 feet) terrain-hugging flight, in which case sub-sonic speeds are preferable. The B-1 also laid a strong emphasis on using Electronic Counter-Measures (ECM)
to defeat Soviet surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles,
which required significant technological leaps.107
A major concern and focus of congressional oversight during the 1970s was cost growth in DoD programs. The Air Force tracked a dozen programs in the
mid-1970s in Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) to
keep abreast of these costs. The programs included
airplanes in the Air Force inventory, like the A-10,
the F-15, and the airborne warning and control systems (AWACs), as well as missile systems (AIM-7 and
AIM-9).108
Inflation played a large part in the seeming skyrocketing costs, but even controlled for inflation,
costs were increasing. The Air Force anticipated an
average of 4.2 percent cost escalation per year from
1977 to 1984 in B-1 procurement costs and nearly 5.8
percent cost escalation per year from 1977 to 1982 in
B-1 development costs in base-year FY77 dollars.109
In August 1975, the Air Force reported to the DoD
Comptroller that the estimated development and pro-
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curement cost of the B-1 would be $16.974 billion, the
largest of the programs captured in the SAR. Only the
F-111 ($12.689 billion), the F-15 ($10.743 billion) and
the Minuteman III ($9.023 billion) came close.110 In October, the Air Force reported a further cost increase
of more than $500 million to the Comptroller, though
this was attributed entirely to “economic change” and
not program change.111
Congressional Concern.
In addition to cost increases, some members of
Congress were concerned the Air Force was not managing the program particularly well and might be
obligating funds not authorized or appropriated by
Congress. Senator Thomas McIntyre, who chaired the
Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Research
and Development, wrote to Secretary of Defense
James Schlesinger in January 1975, expressing his concern that several DoD programs had encountered cost
increases that took them beyond the funding limits
Congress had established for the fiscal year. He was
particularly concerned that DoD was allowing contractors to carry these additional costs in anticipation
of restitution through FY76 funds—essentially using
the following year’s funds to make the contractors
whole for funds expended in the current year.
Senator McIntyre’s concern was real, but also unearthed a significant bind in the way contracts were
written. The two parties to the contract agreed on the
amounts to be spent in any given year for the contract,
but, to prevent the contractor from having to slow or
stop work because of unforeseen cost increases, it allowed for the contractor to carry these costs in anticipation of reimbursement later.112
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The Air Force’s contract with Rockwell International included a provision known as the Limitation
of Government Obligations (LOGO) clause. The contract noted that the project would be funded on an incremental basis, and the government would not hand
over funds to the contractor faster than called for in
the contract. The contract then stated, in the usual turgid contract phraseology: “subject to the availability
of funds, any costs incurred in excess of the amount
allotted hereunder at any time shall, to the extent that
such costs are reasonable and allocable, be allowable
costs in the event that and to the extent that the Government subsequently increases its allotments hereunder.”113 This would appear to violate the LOGO
clause, but the Air Force argued it was in compliance.
The Air Force responded to Senator McIntyre that
under the Anti-Deficiency Act, no U.S. Government
official is allowed to create an obligation in excess of
that authorized and appropriated by Congress. The
Air Force then reasoned that the contractor’s assumption of carrying costs on behalf of the government
does not constitute an obligation on the part of the
government, but merely a “conditional” obligation.
Although convoluted, the Air Force was essentially
saying “yes, but no” to the Senator’s accusation. The
opt-out for the Air Force is that the reimbursement of
the contractor is “subject to the availability of funds,”
which means that if Congress appropriates no funds,
the contractor is left holding the proverbial bag. But
the expectation on the contractor’s part is that the government, the Air Force in this case, is going to make
good in the end and is unlikely to leave the contractor
to absorb the costs. The result is negligible in any case,
the Air Force then contended. Of a nearly $13 billion
total accumulated limit of governmental obligation,
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the estimated costs were only $15 million more, or approximately 1/10 of 1 percent. Also noted is that the
funding level has always been in excess of the bills the
contractor submitted for payment, but, because of the
timing of work and budgeting at the end of the fiscal
year, the occurrence of such cost carrying is temporary and still falls under the LOGO. What this means
is that the contractor may be spending monies above
the authorized levels, but the contractor was not billing the government for the costs, at least not in the
fiscal year in which the costs were incurred.
The Strategic Argument—The FY77 Budget Debate.
The bomber’s primary mission during the Cold
War was to deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the
Soviet Union. The bomber was part of the strategic
triad consisting of bombers, ICBMs, and strategic
missile-launching submarines. For the first decade or
more after the invention of the atomic bomb, warheads
were large and bulky enough that bombers provided
the most reliable means to deliver them on target. But
since the late 1950s, the technology for missiles had
developed considerably, and the early 1970s saw the
advent of multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles (MIRVs), which allowed one missile to deliver warheads onto distributed targets. This gave rise
to a serious examination of whether the bomber force
could survive as a viable leg in the strategic triad. The
Air Force, and the Pentagon in general, continued to
see a future for the bomber in the triad. In his March
1976 congressional testimony, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis & Evaluation
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Pete Aldridge argued that a strategic manned bomber:
• Hedges against ballistic missile failure
• Complicates Soviet attack planning
•	Does not represent a disarming first-strike
capability
• Provides a visible show of resolve
• Constitutes a flexible, multipurpose system
• Is cost effective114
Aldridge’s argument left out one other purported
advantage of the bomber over a missile—its recall ability. Once a missile is launched, it cannot be recalled;
whereas a bomber is subject to recall, therefore giving
added time to resolve a crisis. Additionally, a bomber
is useful as a means to demonstrate resolve or send
a signal, which a missile cannot do. This is what he
meant by visible show of resolve. Aldridge addressed
the idea of allowing the bomber force to atrophy and
pursuing arms limitation talks or more missiles to correct the imbalance with the Soviet Union. He pointed
out that the only options available were constrained
by the Vladivostok Accord,115 which set an upper limit
on the number of ICBM silos. Therefore, any further
missile developments would have to come in the mobile missile field, which the United States, unlike the
Soviet Union, had not invested significant resources
in. He also noted that allowing the bomber force to
phase out would leave the Soviets in the enviable position of having approximately 600 more deployed
missiles (2,400 total) than the United States and would
not likely agree to future agreements to reduce this
advantage.116 The cost of pursuing a mobile ICBM system would likely match or exceed the $20 billion price
tag for a fleet of B-1 bombers.117
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Aldridge compared the alternatives and asserted
that the B-1 provided the most cost-effective means to
address the challenges a penetrating bomber would
face. He argued that ballistic missiles were not a
cost-effective means to suppress or destroy enemy
air defenses (though he ignored the crucial question
of why you would need to do this if you had already
launched a nuclear attack). He also contended that the
Joint Strategic Bomber Study the previous year had
concluded that cruise missiles would not be able to
penetrate air defenses as well as the short-range attack
missile (SRAM) or the B-1, though this relied on assumptions about the eventual capabilities of the B-1’s
electronic countermeasures and the capabilities of the
cruise missile which had yet to be built.118 He went
on to address the aging B-52 bomber force, which was
approaching 20 years old for the B-52D and 15 years
old for the B-52H, the newest of the B-52s. As an aside,
he said that “something is going to have to be done, of
course, to the B-52 force in order to keep it viable into
the 1990’s,” indicating that the B-1 would be a supplement, not a replacement for the B-52.119 He concluded
that “the most cost-effective bomber force, independent of the total size of the force, has a mix of B-1’s
with SRAM’s for penetration of the high value defended targets and the B-52’s which are quite effective
carrying cruise missiles for attack of the undefended
targets.”120 In his view, then, the B-52 would have to
be a penetrating aircraft with short-range nuclear missiles, not the longer-range air-launched cruise missiles
some were arguing for.
In response to a letter from Senator Barry Goldwater, Strategic Air Command Chief General Russell
Dougherty laid out his strong views on why the B-1
was critical to the future deterrence posture of the Unit-
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ed States. Similar to others, he argued that a manned
bomber was an essential factor in providing decisionmakers flexible options in a crisis. He believed that the
manned bomber “offers the United States an overall
flexibility of choice and application that is unmatched
by an [sic] other weapons system.” The bomber could
carry large numbers of both conventional and nuclear
weapons and deliver to multiple fixed targets with an
accuracy over long ranges that he described as “unequalled.”121 A bomber could also accommodate or
be adapted to delivery of many types of weapons, including gravity bombs and standoff launched cruise,
ballistic, semi-ballistic, or defensive weapons.
The bomber would fulfill a key role in a cost-imposing strategy on the Soviets, forcing them to continue pouring money into defensive systems (e.g., air
defense) instead of offensive systems to address the
penetrating bomber threat. He saw the bomber as an
economical means to redress the strategic imbalance
(i.e., get more nuclear weapons onto launch platforms). He also emphasized the point about bombers
as a flexible but visible means to demonstrate resolve.
The bomber could wreak havoc on the enemy and do
so repeatedly, under certain circumstances. Finally, a
bomber can accomplish missions across the spectrum
of military options, not just at the strategic end.122 That
said, General Dougherty did not mention that the B-1
was conceived largely as a single-mission aircraft. Its
entire design from its supersonic cruising speed to
its electronic countermeasures was oriented towards
penetrating Soviet airspace and dropping nuclear
bombs on fixed targets. His argument underscored the
Air Force’s belief that a manned bomber was a critical
component in the strategic triad. Then he turned to
whether the B-1 was the best option for maintaining
the bomber force’s relevance.
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General Dougherty, reflecting the prevailing Air
Force view, said that,
the B-1 [is] the best candidate vehicle reasonably available to satisfy the future requirement for a modern
manned penetrating bomber-and to provide the U.S.
with the diversified characteristics that are and will be
needed in our complementary mix of strategic delivery systems. Not only do I view it as the best, I do not
see any other comparable system that can reasonably
be expected to do this job as I think it must be done for
assurance—or for long-term economics.123

He based this assessment on several critical assumptions and conclusions: First, the United States
needed manned bombers (and in his letter he included a penetrating bomber as part of the requirement), it
needed modern bombers, and the B-1 was the best of
the available options. It is unclear whether the last criterion reflected his knowledge of the stealth program
(which was not yet a bomber program) or if he meant
it to juxtapose with the FB-111, which was the only
other modern aircraft besides the B-52 in competition.
He emphasized several times that the B-1 was a “real
thing,” no doubt to dig at B-1’s opponents for backing unproven technologies. He said the B-1 was “not
a paper study or a theoretical analysis of what might
be or what might satisfy future requirements. The B-1
is here, it is timely, and it is competent—postulated
alternatives meet none of those criteria.”124
General Dougherty’s position was guaranteed to
carry weight. As Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air
Command, General Dougherty was responsible for
the execution of the strategic air attack should the
President ever deem it necessary and was the Director
of Strategic Target Planning for all strategic nuclear
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forces.125 His headquarters at Offutt Air Force Base
in Nebraska was the home of the strategic bomber
force. His opinion, forcefully expressed, would leave
an impression on the assembled Senators. General
Dougherty went into the alternatives under consideration and stated that he did not support them because
“none of them has stood the tests of long-term sufficiency, cost effectiveness, or supportability over the
years ahead. They may have superficial or analytical
appeal to some, but they don’t measure up with those
of us who must maintain and operate our deterrent
forces.”126 General Dougherty asserted that the B-52,
while carrying the “primary deterrent load” for 20
years, was reaching the limits of its adaptability. He
stated that proposed modifications to bring the B-52
forward would be expensive and nonetheless would
not remove the need for the B-1. The proposal to build
a “stretch” version of the FB-111, on the other hand,
would require such upgrades as to render it effectively
a new aircraft “with all the expense, time, and testing
required” of a new platform. With the Air Force being
the primary operators of the FB-111, Dougherty felt
that the airplane was too limited in size, range, and
payload to constitute an adequate alternative.
Once he dismissed other aircraft, Dougherty
moved on to dismiss the air-launched cruise missile
(ALCM) as “extremely dangerous, if not ineffective
and grossly deficient” as a sole replacement for the
bomber. He thought ALCMs could serve a useful secondary role and in low-threat contingencies, but not
against a sophisticated air defense system such as the
Soviets had. He believed that a stand off platform that
launches ALCMs is inherently inflexible, because it
cannot penetrate airspace under any circumstances.
He would be happy to have the ALCMs and the B-1,
but not the ALCMs by themselves.127
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General Dougherty expounded on deterrence
theory in general and pointed to the importance of
perceptions in its application. He saw the B-1 as representing a “quantum jump” in quality over the existing
platforms, which would have visible impact on the
Soviets and in demonstrating national will.128 For him,
only deployed forces played into the decision calculus of actors in deterrence; studies, concepts, and operational tests did not—another dig at B-1 opponents
advocating for technologies such as the ALCM.129 And
the penetrating bomber “is vital to the assured capability of our deterrent forces. Should we risk delay and
then experience any unanticipated challenge to our
ICBMs or our SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic
missiles], the imbalance could be ominous, indeed.”130
Here again is the concern about the reliability of the
missiles in the arsenal, which at this far remove from
the debate seems strange, but at the time was an ongoing concern. The moon landing was barely 8 years
removed, and the problems in missile system development were still a concern, whereas bombers seemed a
more reliable delivery system after more than 35 years
of operational experience.131
In response to a question from Senator Barry
Goldwater, he admitted that a “selective response”
was possible with just the Minuteman or a Poseidon
force, but the risks would be greater.132 SecDef James
Schlesinger also raised the issue of ballistic missile reliability in the February 1975 Defense Report to Congress, in which he underlined the role of the bomber
as a hedge against failure of the missile systems of the
Triad.133
General Dougherty estimated that the life-cycle
cost of maintaining the B-1 fleet would be 75 percent
of that existing B-52/FB-111 fleet.134 This is in stark
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contrast to analysis published by the Brookings Institution that year, which was based on best guesses given published and unclassified material. The study’s
authors, Alton Quanbeck and Archie Wood, believed
that the 10-year procurement and operations cost of
the B-1 (assuming a 210 plane buy) would be slightly
higher than for an equivalent number of B-52s (200,
given the larger payload). The B-1s would be slightly
more expensive ($71.3 billion in 1976 constant dollars
versus $69.6 billion for the B-52s, but operating costs
are higher for the B-52s) and the stand off cruise missile carriers indicated costs some $10 billion less.135
Air Force Chief of Staff General David C. Jones
(who subsequently became Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1978) also advanced a strategic argument for the B-1. His first concern, as with General
Dougherty, was the aging fleet of aircraft in the Air
Force, both tactical and strategic. He argued that the
slide in procurement and accumulated decisions of
the previous 10 years meant that the FY77 budget represented a pivotal decision point for the Air Force. He
stated “what Congress will decide, influenced heavily
by the Committee, is no less than the direction and
character of the future Air Force and therefore, in
large measure, what strategic policy this nation is to
follow.”136 His subsequent strategic argument focused
on the relative balance of forces with the Soviet Union.
General Jones ascribed strategic superiority to
the period from the end of World War II through the
1960s, when the United States fielded strategic forces
superior in number and quality to those of the Soviets.
He described it as a “lower risk, but higher cost” option that the United States abandoned for the “modest
cost, modest risk” of strategic equivalence, which was
the stated policy. He warned against the argument for
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strategic inferiority in which the balance of forces is
irrelevant as long as the United States maintained a
minimal capacity to hold a certain percentage of the
Soviet population and industrial capacity at risk. This
line of reasoning was a setup to lead to an argument
that the B-1 was needed to maintain at least strategic equivalence, while a decision to abandon the B-1
would lead to a slide into strategic inferiority.137 He
attacked the Brookings Institution study as dangling
the promise of short-term cost savings while arguing
for overly narrow mission sets for weapons platforms
and leading to the slide into strategic inferiority. He
tied the efficiency argument directly back to the strategic argument. His said the B-1 was “our number one
priority” in procurement, designed to contribute to
equivalence and based on a long list of factors, many
of which were similar to Aldridge’s and Dougherty’s:
• Synergism of the Triad
• Soviet strategic momentum
• Hedge against failures in other systems138
• Complicate enemy attack
• Flexible
• Demonstrate resolve
• No first strike implications
• Long useful life
• Large payload/megatonnage
• Highly accurate
• Reusable
• Conventional capability
• Stresses enemy air defenses
• Cost effective.139
General Jones was looking to a future where the
relative speed of Soviet modernization against American modernization programs that were “standing still”
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would widen the gap and lead to strategic inferiority
(e.g., through Soviet development of the Backfire strategic bomber and four new ICBMs). He was worried
about heading into the 1980s outfitting the force with
the technology of the 1960s and stated that the B-1 was
the only program in the near term that could stem the
tide of growing Soviet capability and capacity. In his
list comparing U.S. and Soviet advantages, the Soviet list was longer, including more delivery systems,
more missiles, and more civil defense. His argument
clearly showed that he felt the Soviets had the greater
numbers and were catching up on quality, while the
United States had superior technology for the moment.140 Finally, General Jones argued that the B-1 program was sitting in the sweet spot of its development
timeline: if production was delayed, costs would rise,
but enough testing had been done to reduce the risk
of untested technologies. He contrasted the B-1 with
the C-5 cargo aircraft that had experienced significant
problems during development. His analysis of the
sweet spot was clearly a judgment, however, for there
was no reliable way to project where the program was
in its technology maturation and development timeline, and subsequent events would show that significant bugs remained in the program.141
The Air Force wanted 244 B-1s, which would replace many, but not all of the B-52s. General Jones estimated that, depending on Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks (SALT) limitations, the B-1s would replace less
than 50 percent of the B-52s.142 The Air Force began
research and development of the B-1 in 1970 and expected the first operational aircraft to enter the operational force by 1981, with the full 244 buy completed
by 1986.143
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The Brookings Institution versus the Air Force.
It is worthwhile analyzing the Brookings Institution’s study on the strategic bomber force, since it
served as the basis of much of the political discourse
surrounding the B-1 debate in 1976 and 1977, although
it played a minor role in the internal decisionmaking
for the Jimmy Carter administration.144 The study was
the most detailed unclassified and rigorous analysis
of the question surrounding whether to invest in the
B-1. It came in the crucial decision year of 1976 and
put the Air Force somewhat on the back foot as the
Air Force sought to combat the arguments put forth
in the study. In fact, the Air Force produced a 32-page
critique of Quanbeck and Wood’s report, which itself
only comprised 116 pages. The Air Force felt it needed
to respond to the studies produced by the Brookings
Institution because of the influence it supposedly had
in Congress and Secretary of the Air Force Thomas C.
Reed (who served from January 1976 to April 1977)
wanted to be positioned to respond as soon as Quanbeck and Wood’s report came out.145 The Air Force relied on its recently concluded Joint Strategic Bomber
Study (JSBS) to rebut Quanbeck and Wood’s argument.
Quanbeck and Wood were both former Air Force
pilots with significant experience in bombers, so their
professional qualifications were significant. Archie
Wood went on to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Strategic Programs under Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis Gardiner
Tucker from late 1970 to early 1974.146 Their study examined the role of the bomber in the strategic force
and then posited five alternatives for modernizing the
bomber leg of the triad. Their five alternatives were:
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modified B-52G/Hs with rocket assistance for faster
takeoff; B-1s; large transport aircraft such as the C-5
or Boeing 747 modified for strategic use; new aircraft
“designed for maximum ability to survive a surprise
attack”; and modified large transport aircraft with
rocket assistance for faster takeoff.147 They posited that
the bomber force should be designed to attack fixed
industrial and urban targets and sized to deliver the
equivalent of 400 one-megaton nukes to destroy 75
percent of Soviet industrial capacity. For the bomber
force, this would mean 1,200 reliable 200 Kilo-ton nuclear warheads on air-to-surface missiles.148
Quanbeck and Wood went on to analyze the existing state of play for the programs under consideration.
In 1960 the bomber force was over 1,900 strong with
1,230 tankers to keep them in the air. In 1975 these
numbers dropped to 504 and 661, respectively.149 The
B-52G had first deployed in 1959, with an improved
range of 10,000 miles, if unrefueled. This was followed
by the H model, which extended the range to 12,500
miles, thanks to new turbo-fan engines. At the time of
the study’s publication, the Air Force was modernizing the B-52G/Hs to carry up to 20 SRAMs (12 under
the wings and 8 in bay). Each could also carry four
Mark-28 gravity nuclear bombs.150 The FB-111A could
only carry four SRAMs on external pylons and two in
the bomb bay, with a shorter range of 4,100 miles.151
Despite superior performance metrics in all but range,
the B-1’s real cost growth was 16 percent from 1969
to 1974, yielding a cost of $84 million per aircraft in
1976 dollars, though some defense officials apparently
conceded to the study authors that it might cost more
than $100 million each.152 Quanbeck and Wood concluded the high procurement cost of the B-1 would
impact the Air Force’s ability to modernize the rest of
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the inventory.153 In addition, given that the SRAM was
the primary B-1 weapon, the costs should take into account restarting the production line, which was closed
in 1975. Quanbeck and Wood estimated the costs to
be as high as $100 million. They pointed out that ALCMs would have impressive penetration capabilities
because of terrain contour matching, allowing flight at
100 feet and very low radar cross section.154
They also raised the accusation that the Air Force
was slow-rolling the development of ALCMs out of
concern that they would be seen as a replacement for
the manned penetrating bomber instead of a complement. The ALCM was based on the Navy’s cruise missile program. The Air Force had had a program for
long-range cruise missiles under the subsonic cruise
armed decoy (SCAD) program, which would be a
dummy to go in with the B-52s. The Air Force resisted
adding a warhead to the SCAD for fear it would be
promoted as a stand off weapon.155 The SCAD program was approved for both uses by the Senate Armed
Services Committee in 1972, but the Air Force pursued
only the decoy, and the program was canceled in 1973.
The Air Force insisted the cruise missile was a
complement to the penetrating bomber, as Brigadier
General Harold E. Confer of the Air Staff said in response to questions from Senator McIntyre during the
FY75 Military Procurement Authorization hearings:
it complements the manned bomber, but the bomber
will still need to penetrate for the deeper target areas
and the harder targets. The missile will complement
the bomber in that it will soften the defenses and extend the strike capability. It can be utilized for some
of the heavily defended areas’ defense suppression to
augment the bomber forces coming behind. Therefore,
it is still our intent to go ahead and use the penetrat-

52

ing bomber as it was designed to penetrate the enemy
defenses.”156

Quanbeck and Wood concluded their study by
stating “there are marked economic advantages for a
bomber force that carries standoff missiles [and] there
appear to be no significant military advantages to be
gained by deploying a new penetrating bomber such
as the B-1 in preference to this alternative.”157
The Air Force had a distinct advantage in the debate: it could use classified data (which would be more
accurate, but also restricted the circle of those able to
contest and debate the study’s conclusions). The Air
Force accused the Brookings scholars of biasing the
case against the penetrating bomber before even starting their analysis. The Air Force was challenging the
Brookings study’s assumptions, including the implicit
assumption that enemy air defenses could only be defeated through using large numbers of planes, emphasizing mass over all else.158 The Air Force argued that
their analysis was more sophisticated by taking into
account offensive and defensive characteristics such
as the command and control structures, geography,
radar cross section, weapons effects calculations, and
numerous cost-effectiveness reports.159 For example,
they noted that when Quanbeck and Wood estimated
the 400-megaton force equivalent in stand off ALCM
carriers could destroy 75 percent of Soviet industrial
capacity, they were only targeting 50 cities, not the
371 cities that the Air Force believed actually encompassed 75 percent of Soviet industrial capacity.160 The
Air Force said the target set for the force would extend to command and control elements, industry, and
military installations.161 As General Jones stated in his
testimony, “the way Brookings saved money was by
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changing our strategy.”162 He said the Brookings study
emphasized a strategy of minimum assured destruction.
In addition, the Air Force faulted Quanbeck and
Wood for ignoring force mixes and opting for “pure”
comparisons of B-1 forces against B-52 forces and
against wide-body ALCM carriers. The JSBS used six
equal cost forces (as opposed to Quanbeck and Wood,
who used “equal effectiveness” forces), three of which
included a mix of stand-off and penetrating aircraft,
two of which were penetrating forces, and one of which
just looked at the stand-off force.163 The Air Force also
attacked the variables in the model that would produce great sensitivity, such as survivability rates for
the bombers on the ground. The Air Force complained
that Quanbeck and Wood refused to accept tested
crew reaction times, yielding a much starker picture
of B-1 survivability than the Air Force believed would
be the case. This comes through most starkly in a surprise attack with little warning. Quanbeck and Wood
assumed only 31 percent of B-1s would survive if they
were not on high alert, while the Air Force estimated
more than 95 percent would survive.164
The Air Force also noted that the reliance on mass
actually denigrated the planned B-1 capabilities, requiring the full force to deliver the weapons required,
as opposed to looking at the timing of attack. Relying
on supersonic cruise and ECM,
17 early arriving B-1s carrying 24 SCAD each could
have launched the 400 objects necessary to exhaust
the defenses. The remaining aircraft (116 reliable B-1s
would be left in the Quanbeck-Wood analysis) each
carrying 24 SRAM, could have placed more than twice
the number of weapons on target than QuanbeckWood assumed to be required.165
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Finally, the Air Force disputed the cost data of the
Brookings study, noting that the study included the
cost of a new tanker for the B-1 and far more SRAM
and SCAD missiles than the Air Force required.166 The
Air Force argued that once these costs were adjusted
and the indirect costs of support (such as bases and
nondirect personnel) were subtracted, the B-1 alternative force in the Brookings study would cost approximately the same as the cruise-missile standoff force.167
Delaying the Decision.
During the debate over the FY77 Defense budget,
B-1 opponents sought to delay a decision on full-up
production of the plane until after the forthcoming
presidential election. Senator John Culver, a freshman Democrat from Iowa and member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, introduced an amendment to the defense authorization bill in committee in
May 1976 to delay the decision until February 1977,
but it failed to pass. The aircraft’s opponents did not
give up, however, and realized that a floor amendment might pass given the right circumstances.168 The
legislative strategy paid off through a combination of
clever vote scheduling and waiting until the quorum
balance was in their favor. Senator George McGovern, a staunch opponent, introduced an amendment
on May 20 that would have deleted all the funds for
B-1 production from the bill. This measure predictably
failed, but had the benefit of making Senator Culver’s
amendment seem a benign compromise instead. It
passed by a vote of 44 to 37.
The measure was dropped during conference on
the bill, but the B-1 opponents now knew they could
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get the votes and focused on the appropriations bill.
In the mean time, the Federation of American Scientists organized a statement from 19 former defense
officials that asserted the B-1 was not worth the cost.
The signatures included those of Clark Clifford and
McGeorge Bundy, which helped pull the rug out
from under the argument that the anti-B-1 group was
a bunch of “knee-jerk leftists.”169 One name missing
from the petition, despite their efforts to recruit him,
was former DDR&E head and CalTech President Harold Brown. Senator William Proxmire introduced the
amendment into the appropriations bill, successfully
this time, so that the decision on proceeding with the
B-1 production was no longer Ford’s, but would await
a new President in 1977—assuming Ford lost to the
Democratic contender.170
How the Decision Was Made.
The B-1 bomber was unusual in many respects, including the manner in which the decision was made.
Given that President Carter had made a pledge during
the 1976 presidential campaign to cancel the bomber,
the decision was never likely to remain with the DoD.
DoD took the decision very seriously, however, and
examined numerous studies that compared the relative merits of the B-1’s projected capabilities against
a set of other platforms, including the B-52 launching
an air-launched cruise missile, the FB-111 “stretch,”
and a cargo plane such as a C-5 or Boeing 747 with
ALCMs. The B-1 demonstrated superior performance
in a number of scenarios, but the question remained
whether the B-1’s additional capability justified the
expense.171
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Ultimately, the President would decide, and he
relied on an impressive array of data to come to his
decision. Secretary Brown provided a sophisticated
assessment, but did not strongly advocate any one
position.172 Carter met with Brown on at least four occasions and retired to Camp David to contemplate the
large package of information the Pentagon provided.173
On June 24, 1977, in one of their last meetings before
the decision was announced, Brown recommended to
the President that the B-1 be canceled.174 One critical
element of the decision package was a Defense Intelligence Agency assessment of future Soviet air defense
capabilities. The assessment indicated that the B-1 was
likely to provide penetrating capability for between
5 and 10 years longer than the B-52, or into the late
1980s to early 1990s. To some in the White House, this
seemed a marginal benefit given the program’s cost.175
The development of ALCMs weighed significantly on
the decision. By June 1977, the Air Force had yet to
successfully launch an ALCM from an airplane, but
development tests were promising.176 Finally, the B-1
had competition coming in the near future. A highly
classified program under the code name Have Blue
was advancing the development of new technologies
to evade radar detection. While the B-1 relied on ECM
to reduce its radar cross section, this new program,
which would eventually yield “stealth” technologies,
promised to make an airplane virtually invisible by
absorbing radar signals. The B-1 would have had a radar cross section of approximately 10 m2 (compared
to 100 m2 for the B-52 and 7 m2 for the FB-111A), but a
stealth bomber would appear no larger than a bird on
radar.177
Carter realized the momentum was behind the B-1
and that powerful constituencies in Congress backed
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the program. The economic difficulties of the 1970s
weighed heavily on every decision, and the B-1 would
mean jobs in many congressional districts, a fact that
many governors and representatives pointed out to
Candidate Carter during the election campaign. Carter recognized that deciding whether to move forward
was more than a matter of the technical merits of the
case, but also overcoming these powerful constituencies.178
On June 30, 1977, President Carter held a press
conference to announce his decision to cancel the
B-1 bomber program. The reaction was as one might
have expected: liberals were thrilled, conservatives
were aghast, and most members of Congress and the
contractors felt blindsided by the decision.179 Iowa
Democratic Senator John Culver called the decision
a “victory for common sense—the most constructive
and courageous decision on military spending in our
time.”180 California Republican Congressman Robert
Dornan said, on the other hand, “they’re breaking out
the vodka and caviar in Moscow.”181 Some in the Air
Force and beyond pressed General Jones to oppose
the decision more vigorously. He ultimately decided
that it was the President’s decision, and that “we salute smartly and we will not try to undermine that
decision.”182
Postscript: The Air Force Gets Its Plane.
Jimmy Carter lost the 1980 presidential election
to former California Governor Ronald Reagan, who
came into office promising economic recovery, fiscal
discipline, and a tougher stance on national defense.
Although real Defense spending growth began in the
last years of the Carter administration, the 1980s are
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remembered in military circles as the heyday of budget growth under the “Reagan Build-up.” Reagan’s
Secretary of Defense, Casper “Cap” Weinberger, was
determined to invest in defense capabilities.183 Much
of the Republican Party felt the Carter administration
had dangerously weakened the military and U.S. national security, and the B-1 cancellation was the symbol of that weakness.184
Weinberger was not going to be a pushover, however. The Air Force, like all the Services, had a wish
list it brought to the new Secretary for approval, but
Weinberger wanted to ensure he made the right decisions. At the same time, he felt the Service chiefs and
Service secretaries should play a greater role in the
budgeting process.185 Ultimately, the Reagan administration went forward with a 100-plane buy of the
B-1, well below the 242 the Air Force had originally
sought. President Reagan announced the decision
in October 1981 as part of a strategic modernization
program to address the persistent and growing Soviet
threat.186 Weinberger stated his belief that the Carter
administration was willing to live with too much risk
stemming from an aging B-52 bomber force and the
uncertain schedule to mature the capabilities of the
advanced technology bomber (ATB), which would
become the B-2 stealth bomber. He portrayed the investment in the B-1 as a less risky course, with initial
operating capability coming in 1986. This would provide a penetrating platform into the 1990s alongside
the continued development of cruise missiles.187 Once
the B-2 was fielded, the B-1B would shift from a “strategic penetrator” to a platform for launching ALCMs.
The total cost of the 100 B-1Bs would be approximately
$258 billion in FY83 dollars once fully fielded.188
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The B-1B Lancer flew its first combat mission in
1998 as part of Operation DESERT FOX, a punitive
strike against an array of targets in Saddam Hussein’s
Iraq.189 But the B-1 was eclipsed by its bomber cousins, the F-117 and the B-2 Spirit, both of which were
designed from the start to have conventional and nuclear missions, whereas the B-1’s sole mission was as
a nuclear penetrator.190 After less than 20 years in the
force and limited use in combat, another Republican
administration announced the retirement of a third
of the B-1B fleet and consolidation of the remaining
planes in 2001.191
Conclusion.
The B-1 bomber was an ambitious program in
terms of technology (e.g., electronic countermeasures
and escape module) and scale. The Air Force started
from a decision that the B-52 was aging, and a replacement was needed. This narrow focus on the bomber
allowed many of its opponents to grab the initiative
in the strategic debate over the role of the penetrating bomber in a broader strategy of deterrence and response. It was unquestionably an expensive program,
but the Air Force felt that the expense was worthwhile
to keep up with the Soviets as they developed more
sophisticated air-defense systems. The civilian Defense leaders needed to address a broader question,
given promising new technologies that could render
the race between penetrating bombers and air defense
systems obsolete. Much as HMS Dreadnought led to an
apparent wholesale obsolescence of entire classes of
ships in the early 20th century, stealth technology and
cruise missiles offered the possibility of a technological leap over the air defense problem. The Air Force
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started with the assumption that a manned, penetrating bomber was still an integral part of the strategic
force, whereas some of the civilian leadership and external experts sought to challenge that view.
Congress played a strong role on both ends of the
argument. The extended timelines for developing the
prototypes and making procurement decisions gave
the bomber’s congressional opponents time to muster
their arguments against the program. The proponents
of the program built a loyal caucus of B-1 devotees,
many of whom had flown in a prototype and dealt
directly with Rockwell executives. Rockwell, for its
part, sought to influence not just Congress, but public opinion on the bomber by sponsoring surveys and
public outreach to establish the B-1 as crucial to national defense.
THE CRUSADER ARTILLERY SYSTEM
You’re going to lose this one.192
—Army Officer
It was a victory, I guess.193
—Senior Defense Official

The debate over the Army’s Crusader artillery
system is indicative of how heated and vicious the
conflict between Defense’s civilian leadership and a
military service can get. As with the B-1, the Crusader
program tried to push the technological envelope,
ultimately to the program’s detriment. The opposing
sides had vastly different perspectives on the program that grew wider apart as the debate progressed.
Eventually it would devolve into accusations of deceit
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and mutual recriminations. The program began as an
examination of how to address certain tactical problems, but eventually grew to signify, in some observers’ views, everything that was wrong with the Army
at the dawn of the 21st century. Crusader proponents
and opponents put forward absolute arguments, but
ultimately the civilian leadership in Defense made
its decision based on a relative comparison between
Crusader and other technologies, balanced against the
strategic direction they laid out for the Armed Forces.
Origins of the Debate.
Texas Governor George W. Bush came to The
Citadel, a state-sponsored military academy in South
Carolina, in the fall of 1999 to give a speech establishing his national security credentials. Except for parttime service in the Texas Air National Guard and as
the head of the Texas Guard, Governor Bush had no
experience in international and security affairs. His
time as governor had focused on domestic issues such
as education, and he needed to establish his vision for
the military and national security. The Citadel would
provide a friendly atmosphere to lay out his ideas.
Much of Bush’s speech focused on contrasting his
approach to the military and overseas operations from
that of the incumbent President, Bill Clinton. He said,
“[S]ending our military on vague, aimless, and endless deployments is the swift solvent of morale.”194 But
he also emphasized the need to take advantage of the:
opportunity . . . created by a revolution in the technology of war. Power is increasingly defined, not by
mass or size, but by mobility and swiftness. Influence
is measured in information, safety is gained in stealth,
and force is projected on the long arc of precision62

guided weapons. This revolution perfectly matches
the strengths of our country—the skill of our people
and the superiority of our technology. The best way to
keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms. Yet today our military is still organized more for Cold War
threats than for the challenges of a new century—for
industrial age operations, rather than for information
age battles. There is almost no relationship between
our budget priorities and a strategic vision. The last 7
years have been wasted in inertia and idle talk. Now
we must shape the future with new concepts, new
strategies, new resolve. . . . As president, I will begin
an immediate, comprehensive review of our military—the structure of its forces, the state of its strategy, the priorities of its procurement—conducted by a
leadership team under the Secretary of Defense. I will
give the Secretary a broad mandate—to challenge the
status quo and envision a new architecture of American defense for decades to come. We will modernize
some existing weapons and equipment, necessary for
current tasks. But our relative peace allows us to do
this selectively. The real goal is to move beyond marginal improvements—to replace existing programs
with new technologies and strategies. To use this window of opportunity to skip a generation of technology. This will require spending more—and spending
more wisely. We know that power, in the future, will
be projected in different ways.195

He went on to describe a future force that was
lighter, faster, and more lethal than before, able to
deploy rapidly and require little logistical support.
He even spoke of mobile long-range artillery. It was
an ambitious vision, but it left a number of questions
open. What does it mean to “skip a generation” of
technology? How do we balance lethality, speed, and
force protection? Interestingly, many people involved
in the Crusader case later on recalled then-Governor
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Bush speaking directly about Cold War-era weapons
systems “like the Crusader and V-22,” but these lines
do not appear in the text of his speech.196 In fact, he
came into some criticism from the likes of The Washington Post for his lack of specificity.197 His chief aides
on national security at the time, Condoleezza Rice,
Richard Armitage, and Dick Cheney, all refused to
comment on specific platforms or program decisions
in the immediate aftermath of the speech. Armitage
may have obliquely referred to Crusader when he
said programs or planned upgrades may be deferred
or canceled if the platforms “are difficult to deploy.”198
As the presidential campaign entered the election
year, then-Governor Bush mentioned the Crusader as
one example of wasteful spending, stating, “it looks
like it’s too heavy. It’s not lethal enough.”199
Army Transformation.
Less than a month after Governor Bush spoke at
the Citadel, General Eric Shinseki, the new Chief of
Staff of the Army, addressed one of the most powerful
organizations affiliated with the Army—the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA). On October 12, 1999,
Shinseki delivered the keynote speech at AUSA’s
annual meeting and outlined his vision for Army
transformation. In many respects, his vision seemed
to accord with Governor Bush’s. He wanted a faster,
lighter, more lethal Army.
Shinseki began by noting that:
our superb heavy divisions remain unequalled in
their ability to gain and hold ground in the most intense, horrifying direct fire battles we could imagine.
And with our investments in strategic mobility, they
become the decisive element in the major theater wars
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we envision. But these same divisions are challenged
to get to other contingencies where we have not laid
the deployment groundwork as well. And once deployed, it takes significant cost to sustain them. Our
magnificent light forces—the toughest light infantry in
the world—can strike lightning fast but lack staying
power, lethality, and tactical mobility once inserted.200

Shinseki wanted to leverage greater reachback
communications and intelligence to reduce deployed
support elements, so that if it is not deployed “some
maneuver commander won’t have to feed it, fuel it,
move it, house it, or protect it.” He advocated C-17
deployable systems that could also fit a “C-130-like
profile” for intra-theater tactical movement. He said
that the Army would “prioritize solutions which optimize smaller, lighter, more lethal, yet more reliable,
fuel efficient, and more survivable options.” Shinseki
was asking for a lot. He laid down a marker for combat-capable brigades that could deploy in 96 hours
anywhere in the world, followed by a full division in
120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.201
In an article published in the AUSA “Green Book,”
Shinseki described a “nonnegotiable contract with the
American people to be a warfighting Army-persuasive
in peace, invincible in war-preeminent in any conflict.”
To achieve this pre-eminence, Shinseki defined six
objectives: (1) increasing strategic responsiveness; (2)
developing a long-term strategy to improve jointness;
(3) developing leaders for joint warfighting and for
change; (4) integrating the active and reserve components; (5) fully manning warfighting units; and (6)
providing for the well-being of Army personnel, civilians, and families.202
The origins of the Crusader artillery system long
predate Shinseki’s tenure as Chief of Staff. The pri65

mary self-propelled artillery platform for more than
40 years had been the M109 artillery system, the thencurrent version being the M109A6 Paladin.203 In the
mid-1980s the Army launched an effort to modernize
the heavy forces, with the Paladin replacement part
of the effort. The heavy force modernization effort,
which combined three heavy-tracked and armored
vehicles into one program, proved unwieldy as a
single program and unraveled in 1991. The artillery
platform survived the collapse of the Soviet Union
and proceeded towards Milestone B (system development and demonstration) as a standalone program in
1992.204 The program had ambitious technology development goals, including using liquid propellant,
a mid-barrel cooling system, an auto-loading system,
higher rates of fire, and improved accuracy.205 In the
aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Army
refined the requirements of the system, lowering the
desired range from 50 kilometers unassisted range to
40 kilometers of rocket-assisted range. The rate of fire
was reduced from 14 rounds per minute to 10, and the
weight was reduced to increase mobility. The Army
held firm on the accuracy required.206
The system was to deploy in the mid-1990s, but
ran into significant problems, particularly in maturing
the technology for the liquid propellant. Artillery has
used roughly the same technology for over 100 years
for propelling the munition, which is based on solid
propellant pre-measured into bags. Once the gunner
has determined how far he has to fire, he can plot a
firing solution that tells him how much solid propellant to use. During the American Civil War, this was
measured out by hand, but through the years a system
of bags with equal amounts of propellant emerged,
which required adjusting the number of bags depend-
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ing on how much propellant was needed. Five bags
might go in the chamber, and the other three would
be discarded later. The attraction of liquid propellant
was the ability to precisely meter out the amount of
propellant desired.
The problems were formidable, however. One
problem came from the simple physics of injecting a
liquid into a tube filled with air. The liquid would fill
the tube, but an angled gun will have a small pocket of
air at the top, which results in uneven burn. Additionally, the liquid was dense and could not be carried in
an ordinary tanker truck; the rocking back and forth of
the fluid could unbalance the truck or break through
a normal thin-skinned tanker. So the Army moved
to 55-gallon drums to hold the corrosive propellant.
Eventually the Army had to abandon liquid propellant after a series of spectacular failures.207
By 1994, the Crusader had emerged as its own
program under the name with which it would gain
its fame. In 1998, the Army asked RAND to “explore
the utility of the Crusader system to the future of the
Army.”208 The RAND study looked at the ability of
Paladin to support the maneuver forces, which the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army felt was limited
due to limited mobility and a slow rate of fire.209 The
report looked at the ability of the M109 in comparison
to the Bradley fighting vehicle and the Abrams tank.
It found that the M109 had shortcomings in terms of
firepower (both rate of fire and range), cross-country
mobility, manual loading, and survivability from
counterfire.210
The M109A6 Paladin was fielded in 1993 with improved fire control and the ability to navigate better
than its predecessor, the M109A5. It could receive fire
missions via radio and had computer-calculated firing
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data, but the Crusader would yield better results than
this.211 The report concluded that the Crusader, which
at this point would weigh 55 tons, or 110 tons with its
resupply vehicle, was a near-term solution to partner
with the Bradley and Abrams, but would not mesh
with the vehicles foreseen for the Army After Next,
which at the time the Army planned to field starting
in 2015.212 Revealingly, the report advocated the Crusader as a technology demonstration and maturation
vehicle for technologies planned for the Army After
Next.213
For much of the Army, the report underlined the
principal problem with the Paladin: it was not as capable as other systems available on the world market.
The Paladin had a shorter maximum range than the
German PzH 2000, Chinese PLZ45, Russian 2S19, and
British AS90, among others. Additionally, it carried
less on-board ammunition, and had a lower rate of
maximum fire. The Paladin could compete with most
platforms in weight (it was lighter than all except for
the Slovak ZTS, a wheeled system), on-road speed,
and crew size (most had a crew of four or five).214 The
Crusader, as planned in 1998, would improve on all
these parameters.
Changes to the Program, 1999-2001.
By the time Shinseki took over the Army (he had
been Vice Chief of Staff of the Army), the Crusader
had been in the works for more than 10 years and still
not emerged as a prototype or fielded platform. After
Shinseki’s AUSA speech, the Crusader was the subject of several conversations at the highest levels of
the Army, not as a candidate for cancellation, but to
see how the Crusader could be saved.215 The Crusader
played into the Army’s vision of itself as the ultimate
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master of maneuver warfare, involving massive firepower to overwhelm the enemy along a broad front.
There is no indication that Shinseki contemplated
cancelling Crusader (despite its apparent incongruent
place in his vision for a more agile force), but he did
want to bring its weight down to make it more deployable. Some have argued that Shinseki protected
the Crusader as part of a grand bargain to gain support within the Army for his transformation vision.216
The Crusader was meeting some of its targets. In
January 2000, the prototype gun SPH1 fired 60 rounds
at an average of 9.78 rounds per minute. The Milestone II criteria only called for six rounds per minute,
so the Crusader prototype had already come close to
meeting its final objective of 10 rounds per minute,
and it loaded the entire cycle of 60 rounds through the
auto-loader in just 6.5 minutes.217 Having completed
this round of testing, the prototype was shipped to
Yuma Proving Grounds in Arizona for a scheduled
2 1/2 years of live fire testing. Despite this success,
the Army’s FY2001 budget submission was projected
to scale back the Crusader purchase, in part to invest
funds in transforming towards the Shinseki vision of
a lighter, more mobile, and lethal force.218 The funding would provide $1 billion to stand up the initial
Brigade Combat Teams and invest in the Future Combat Systems science and technology development
programs, which anticipated at the time, according
to then-Secretary of the Army Louis Caldera, fielding
the Objective Force around 2012.219 A key piece of the
budget was reducing the Crusader buy from 1,138 to
480 guns (and an equal number of resupply vehicles).
Over the course of FY2000 to FY2014, this yielded, according to Caldera, $11.2 billion in reduced expenditures the Army wanted to put towards its transformation.220 The Army still wanted the Crusader, but was
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running into problems funding its full list of desired
equipment. Caldera conceded that the Crusader was
mainly important to the heavy forces “that are going
to be with us for another quarter-century.”221
Implementing the Transformation Agenda.
Donald Rumsfeld had served as Secretary of Defense once before, at the end of the Ford administration, but the Pentagon he inherited in 2001 seemed in
many respects not to have changed much in the ensuing 24 years. Like McNamara before him, Rumsfeld
had a mandate for change from the President and the
determination to establish control over the Department to steer it in new directions and shake it out
of its perceived lethargy.222 During his confirmation
hearing, he said:
we need to ensure that we will be able to develop and
deploy and operate and support a highly effective
force capable of deterring and defending against new
threats. This will require a refashioning of deterrence
and defense capabilities. The old deterrence of the
cold-war era is imperfect for dissuading the threats of
the new century and for maintaining stability in our
new national security environment.223

Rumsfeld was limited in his ability to address
acquisition issues because of his complex personal
finances that he sought to hold on to. As with other
people who enter high-level government service, he
was advised to divest himself from his investments.224
During his first year in office, he recused himself from
decisions on acquisitions in an attempt to avoid this
divestment.225 He wanted to run the Pentagon his second time around using the benefits of more than 2 de-
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cades in the private sector, including a successful stint
as the chief executive officer (CEO) of the pharmaceutical company G. D. Searle. His concept was to use a
corporate board structure. He would provide the vision and rely on senior staff to implement that vision.
The Service secretaries—Tom White of the Army, Jim
Roche of the Air Force, and Gordon England of the
Navy—would be his senior vice presidents in charge
of the Pentagon’s “business units.”226 All three had
come from the private sector and understood the need
for cost-cutting and decisive action. Rumsfeld expected the same approach to translate to the DoD.
In mid-April 2001, Rumsfeld met with his three
service secretaries and told them that they would have
to look at programs to cut in order to fund transformation in the DoD. This meeting was his attempt to give
marching orders to his “corporate board.” The F-22
fighter, Crusader, and the Comanche helicopter may
not have been explicitly discussed but were clearly
in mind, given how much press they had received
during the campaign and afterwards. Any time media outlets discussed potential transformation, these
platforms were first to be mentioned as candidates for
cancellation.227
Rumsfeld convened a series of review panels to
undertake a fundamental review of the DoD strategy
and programs in the spring of 2001. The panels included his senior advisors and some outside experts,
but the deliberations were largely opaque to outside
observers and even many Pentagon civil servants and
military officers.228 In April 2001, one of the panels
recommended cancelling the Crusader, citing a perceived disjuncture between the program’s capabilities and the new defense strategy that relied on swift
power projection and joint fires. One official said, “the

71

Crusader effectively got the ax from the panel because
it didn’t fit the agenda. It’s a wonderful system—for a
legacy world.”229 But this was the recommendation of
just one panel, and Rumsfeld was under no obligation
to accept the recommendations.
At least 10 other panels convened at the same time
had yet to report their findings, leading some in the
Services to hold back on engaging too aggressively.230
Some members of Congress, such as Oklahoma Representative and former college football star J. C. Watt,
were less reticent. He termed the panel’s recommendation “unwise” and released a statement emphasizing that “no final decisions have been made.”231 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz felt that the
panel had overstated the case against the Crusader.
He believed the early arguments against the Crusader
did not offer adequate alternatives.232
Crusader was always a target for elimination,
though not always at the highest levels. In early May
2001, Comptroller Dov Zakheim reviewed with senior
defense officials a series of slides that Secretary Rumsfeld was due to take to President Bush. The briefing
provided some strategy, but also posed some potential program decisions for the FY2002 budget, including retiring all the B-1 bombers, stretching out the
V-22 procurement, and cancelling the Crusader.233 The
White House and senior Defense officials decided not
to proceed with these proposed changes, but it was
likely that further discussions would occur.
The Impact of 9/11 on the Department’s Strategy.
On September 10, 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld delivered a speech to an audience of civilian DoD employees arguing that the bureaucracy was a “threat” and
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an “adversary.” He promised to liberate the Department from itself.234 Additionally, work on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was wrapping up after
a long and brutal summer of fights, internal reviews,
and backtracking on plans for radical changes to force
structure. And then the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 (9/11) seemed to render much of the discussions moot. The United States was at war and needed
to mobilize. A significant outcome of the events of that
day was that thoughts about reducing the active duty
Army by two divisions were quickly shelved.235
Canceling a program is not the only way to transform, but it is a powerful signal. The revised FY2002
budget request sought more money, but did not cancel programs. The budget request for fiscal year 2003
working inside the Pentagon had to be revised in
light of 9/11 and the war in Afghanistan. But some
programs were still under consideration for termination, revision, or retention, particularly the F-22, the
V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, the DD(X) destroyer, the Crusader, and the Army’s Future Combat Systems—all
big-ticket projects that had had troubled histories of
one sort or the other.
Despite preliminary talk about cutting programs,
the President’s budget request submitted in February 2002 still contained $475.6 million for continued
development of the Crusader artillery system. At this
point, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz had heard from
many constituents that the Crusader should be cancelled, that it was a Cold War relic and was completely
inappropriate for the current or future security environment, but Wolfowitz felt that the Army had made
enough of an argument to continue developing the
system. In his mind, the critics’ claims seemed overblown and offered few or no alternatives.236 Rumsfeld
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argued that cancelling programs was not an ideal
measure of transformation, but his critics dismissed
such arguments as “lame” and accused him of surrendering to the Services and pronounced his transformation efforts dead on arrival.237
Secretary of the Army Thomas White and General
Shinseki testified before Congress in March on the program, among many others, and on the Army budget.
Hawaii Senator Daniel Inouye, who was the Defense
Appropriations Subcommitee Chairman, gave White
and Shinseki the opportunity to defend the Crusader,
noting that “almost every day there’s some article in
the paper” criticizing the program. White responded
by recalling the days when he grew up in an Army
outgunned by the Soviets and other adversaries. He
said the United States had not fielded a new artillery
cannon on a “brand new” chassis since the early 1960s
and that the M109 was on its sixth major modification.238 Though this was technically true, it was somewhat disingenuous, given that the M109A6 variant
was less than 10 years old at this point.
Shinseki added his belief that accusations terming
Crusader a Cold War relic were primarily based on
the excessive weight of the system, but since it had
gone on a “slim fast diet” (as Secretary White termed
it), it would be down to 40 tons. He asked whether
the Army wanted a system even lighter than that.
Answering his own question, he said that naturally a
lighter weapon would be desirable, but the existing
technology and requirements for stability, while ensuring long-range heavy artillery, simply ruled out
anything lighter. Shinseki said, “you just can’t overcome the mechanics.”239 Despite his call for platforms
that were C-17 deployable to theater and tactically deployable by C-130, he emphasized that the Crusader
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was destined to go into the heavy counterattack corps,
3rd Corps, which would deploy by ship. To paint the
picture of how much additional fire power fewer Crusaders could provide, he said that “four Crusaders
in Kosovo would have put steel in every inch of that
province, and that’s the capability we’ve needed for
years.”240
As late as April 9, 2002, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz was still defending the Crusader in public, though
not as unequivocally as the Army was. At a Senate
Armed Services Committee hearing, Michigan Senator and Committee Chairman Carl Levin asked Wolfowitz about the Crusader, noting its weight, inability to transport on the C-130, and shorter range than
other Army fire systems. Wolfowitz responded that
“the Crusader of today is not the Crusader that people were talking about some 2 years ago. The Army .
. . responded to the appropriate criticism that it was
much too heavy to move anywhere by redesigning
the vehicle and reducing it so that the weight of the
total system is down by about a third.”241 He noted
that there were future planned systems and also precision artillery munitions—the Excalibur round—in
development or on the drawing board. Senator Levin
pressed Wolfowitz for an assessment of Crusader, to
which he responded that “my summary is that Crusader is . . . a little bit in between. It is a system that
brings us some dramatic new capabilities, but if we
can bring forward some of the transformational capabilities more rapidly, we might see ways to put that
Crusader technology into a different system.”242 It was
hardly a ringing endorsement and gave some indication of where he was leaning at this point.
Privately, however, Wolfowitz had his doubts. His
doubts grew over the course of several months and
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a series of meetings with the Army and OSD staff to
review the analysis. Further, Wolfowitz felt that the
Army was not giving him the straight story. Several
of his advisors brought to his attention that the Army
seemed to be slipping the timelines for development
of the precision-guided artillery munition known as
Excalibur just days after Wolfowitz had asked about
speeding up its deployment.243
Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation (PA&E) head
Barry Watts sent Wolfowitz a memo on April 24 containing the analytical background for canceling the
Crusader. His memo was strongly worded and clearly
advocated canceling the system, using a broader picture to elevate the discussion above a debate over the
merits of different artillery systems. It pointed to the
entire “fires” picture, including systems organic to the
Army, as well as Air Force and Navy assets. He stated
that “this short paper . . . provides enough information
and analysis for you and the Secretary to reach a decision on Crusader.” Watts wanted to avoid a situation
in which the Army could drag out the decisionmaking process, aided and abetted by OSD Policy, including another round of studies on the Crusader in the
Defense Planning Guidance.244 The memo went through
Wolfowitz’s front office the next day. On Friday, April
26, 2002, Wolfowitz met with his senior OSD advisors,
including acquisition chief Pete Aldridge; Aldridge’s
deputy, Mike Wynne; Rumsfeld’s special assistant,
Larry DiRita; Barry Watts; and Wolfowitz’s special assistant, Jaymie Durnan. The meeting covered a number of funding issues before coming around to a discussion of the Crusader.
Wolfowitz emphasized his desire to use all the
funds in the current budget (the FY02 budget had $475
million) and the next year’s budget ($485 million) for
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precision weapons, Future Combat Systems Research
and Development (R&D) and global positioning
system (GPS) guidance to retro-fit 155-mm artillery
rounds. His point was to ensure that the Army still
benefited from the funds and the decision to cancel
the Crusader could not be “unraveled.”245 This was an
OSD-only meeting, however, and Wolfowitz had yet
to discuss his thinking with the Army.
Ten Days of Decision.
On April 29, 2002, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz
and Aldridge went to see Secretary Rumsfeld to tell
him their decision to cancel the Crusader. Rumsfeld
asked if they had done all the analysis to support the
decision. When they responded in the affirmative,
Rumsfeld okayed the decision and told Wolfowitz to
carry out the necessary next steps. Upon returning to
his office, Wolfowitz summoned Army Secretary Tom
White to inform him of the decision.246 Secretary White
asked for more time to think about the implications
of the decision. Wolfowitz had told him the Crusader
was to be cancelled, and that he, White, should examine the impact of this decision on the Army programs,
particularly investing in other programs such as the
future non-line of sight cannon and “net-fires.” Wolfowitz wanted to find out how to spend the money
within the Army program to move these other programs forward.247
It is unclear whether Secretary White understood
this was the decision. Several participants in the meeting and close to the situation had conflicting assessments of the focus of the meeting. Ray DuBois felt
that the Deputy Secretary had not clearly conveyed
his decision to White. He felt that Tom White came
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away from the meeting thinking he had managed to
get a reprieve of 30 days before a final decision would
be made.248 According to Jaymie Durnan, Wolfowitz
went back to Rumsfeld after the meeting with White
to tell him that he had given White 30 days to study
the problem. Rumsfeld took this to mean the Crusader
had not, in fact, been cancelled.249 In Washington, and
especially the Pentagon, a decision is often not taken
as final, but as an invitation to further debate.
The next day (Tuesday, April 30), Wolfowitz apparently decided that another 30 days would yield
nothing new that countless other reviews and analyses
had not already revealed. He discussed the decision
with Rumsfeld, who agreed. Wolfowitz then met with
Secretary White later that afternoon to reiterate his decision. Secretary White allegedly complained that the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary did not know what
they were doing.250 Shortly after the meeting, a set of
Army talking points strongly advocating the Crusader system and accusing the Secretary of Defense of trying to score transformation points while endangering
soldiers’ lives began to appear on fax machines on the
Hill and in the Pentagon.251 The Army talking points
set off a fire storm, with one participant telling Secretary Rumsfeld that it constituted rank insubordination
on the Army’s part.252
The cat was out of the bag, but the formal steps
still remained. Secretary Rumsfeld notified the White
House of the decision on May 7 and the next day held
a press conference to publicly announce the decision.
After some brief remarks, he turned the press conference over to Wolfowitz and White to explain the decision.
The decision to cancel the program caused consternation on the Hill. Some members of Congress were
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apoplectic, asserting that the decision had come out of
the blue and, more crucially, had not included consultations with them.253 Oklahoma Senator James Inhofe
asserted that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard
Myers, Vice Chairman Peter Pace, General Shinseki,
Army Vice Jack Keane, several combatant commanders, and Generals Schwartz and LaPorte from U.S.
Forces Korea had all told him they were not apprised
of the decision prior to the May 8 public announcement.254 The Senate Armed Services Committee wanted to get to the bottom of the issue and convened a
hearing on May 16, 2002.
The first session featured Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz,
Aldridge, and Wynne; the second session featured
General Shinseki. Senator Levin convened the hearing,
stating that the two fundamental questions the Committee wished to have answers to were “what changed
in the Department’s view of the Crusader program,
particularly in the last several weeks . . . [and] are the
advantages and capabilities of Crusader sufficient to
justify the costs?”255 Secretary Rumsfeld said the decision to cancel Crusader resulted from months of
review and balanced risk across the four areas identified in the 2001 QDR, not just based on near-term warfighter needs.256 He stated further that “tough choices
are made at the margins, often between programs that
are both desirable, and both wanted, but nonetheless,
choices have to be made . . .”257 He pointed to the success in Afghanistan that demonstrated that flexibility,
speed of deployment and employment, the problems
of restricted access to the area of operations, and the
integration of ground forces with air assets all pointed
to options other than the Crusader.258
Shinseki’s testimony emphasized his belief that
the Army still needed the Crusader, again noting its
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superior range, speed, and volume of fire. He noted
that cancellation was an option in the Army’s 30-day
study, but he had not had the opportunity to examine
the OSD analysis supporting cancellation.259 He also
said that “if you have imprecise locations, or if you
just know that there’s enemy forces out there, but you
don’t have them accurately located, precision doesn’t
help you very much,” essentially shooting holes in
one of the primary OSD arguments for other platforms.260 Most of OSD’s arguments, and particularly
Rumsfeld’s focus, were on precision. The Army still
wanted mass.
Essence of a Decision: The Tactical versus the
Strategic.
The Army is a tactical organization; even Army
officers will acknowledge this.261 The Army’s focus
on the Crusader came down to a concern about how
the artillery functioned tactically on the battlefield,
whether it could keep up with other armor forces,
and if it could outgun the adversary. The senior civilian leadership in the Department had other concerns:
how can we shape and pay for a new military that will
carry out the missions of the 21st century?
The Crusader suffered from its extended development timeline. As one Army officer involved with
the program said, “it just took too long to get it to the
field.”262 The repeated delays in fielding the Crusader
and changing requirements, particularly in 1999 and
2000, meant that the Crusader would be fielded in 2008,
which at the time was forecasted as the year when the
Future Combat System would be fielded. This begged
the obvious question: Why would the Army continue to pursue a weapons system like Crusader when
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its replacement was due to take the field at the same
time?263 Second, most Army analysis compared artillery systems to artillery systems, but ignored other fire
systems, such as the multiple-launch rocket system
(MLRS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and attack helicopters. At one point during
the analysis, PA&E realized the oversight and added
these other systems to the picture.264
But this only explains how the civilian leadership
decided that the Crusader had to be canceled. What
brought the decision about at the time it happened?
This is a subject of some conjecture, because it is unclear when the real transition occurred. Many in the
Army believed at the time and still believe that the
decision was purely political and not based on analysis.265 Part of the answer lies in a growing sense in OSD
that the Army was not presenting an honest case for
the program. The changes in the Excalibur program,
including a slipping timeline and a change to make it
exclusively a Crusader munition, gave senior DoD officials an uneasy feeling. Additionally, some independent-minded Army officers pointed out to Wolfowitz
that the need for speed to keep up with the Abrams
tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles was a red herring:
the entire Army could not keep up with the armor vehicles, let alone the artillery. Finally, the White House
was exerting pressure on the Pentagon to show results
in the effort to transform the Army. The 2003 budget
request with Crusader funding had raised numerous
questions and requests for additional justification
from White House officials, including the Vice President, even after the budget submission in February.266
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Summary.
One senior OSD official summarized the Crusader decisionmaking process by saying “we made just
about every mistake in the book. We didn’t understand the process . . . we had no guidance on if you
want to take this on, here’s what you need to do . . .”267
The arguments on both sides can seem compelling—
the Army had longstanding concerns about the ability
to provide fire support to forces against superior forces or peer-competitors, whereas the civilians in OSD
had trouble understanding how the Crusader fit into a
strategic framework of future warfare based more on
precision than on mass. The arguments against Crusader were long-standing. By 2002, it had become a
poster child for what many thought was wrong with
the Army. Some believed that Rumsfeld and others
saw it as a prime example of the Army unable to adapt
to future warfare.268 The lack of a coherent case and
the impression that the Army was changing its story
eventually swayed the civilian leadership against the
Crusader.269
CONCLUSION AND OBSERVATIONS
In an April 1963 address to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors, McNamara said that “the Secretary of Defense—and I am talking about any Secretary
of Defense—must make certain kinds of decisions, not
because he presumes his judgment to be superior to
his advisers, military or civilian, but because his position is the best place from which to make these decisions.”270 Under Title 10, the Service secretaries and
chiefs have the responsibility to equip the forces, but
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the SecDef has the responsibility to look across the Defense enterprise and ensure the requirements of the
Department as a whole are met. The case studies examined demonstrate that the interests of a Service can
conflict with those of the Department.271
There are asymmetries of information in acquisition. The Services often have larger staffs dedicated
to generating requirements, evaluating alternatives,
and overseeing programs. Despite that, the Secretary
of Defense must have sufficient capacity to take an independent look at major weapons programs from a
strategic and, yes, budgetary perspective. As Donald
Rumsfeld said at the May 16, 2002, hearing on the Crusader, often the question is not whether a particular
program is a good program or not (though there are
some that fall in this category), but whether it makes
sense from a relative cost and comparative capabilities
perspective. This provides the kernel of conflict.
The DoD today relies to a great extent on the systems and procedures originally put in place under
McNamara, though subsequent SecDefs have made
their own modifications. The system was designed
to provide the information a Secretary would need to
make informed decisions and trade-offs. But tradeoffs often require picking winners and losers, which
is made more difficult when lives are potentially on
the line. Systems analysis provides one means to make
these difficult choices and isolate the emotional from
the rational.
Operational commanders in particular show disdain for the systems analysis approach. Chick Hayward (the commander of the Enterprise task force
during the Cuban Missile Crisis and somewhat of a
maverick in his own right) typifies this attitude:
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Another, even more weird exercise [McNamara] and
his “Whiz Kids” were running constantly was what he
called “cost-effective analysis,” studies on what a proposed new weapon system would do compared to an
existing one it was to replace, to reveal if that would
be worth the increased (usually) item cost. In effect,
he was using arithmetic to make judgment calls on
military combat capability, and usually poor ones, at
that, because his statistics ignored half the real-world
equation, the “people” factor. Yet, in spite of “Management” McNamara, we in “labor” knew that how
well a ship or aircraft performs depends not on what
the engineering specs say it can do but on how well
it’s maintained, how skilled the pilot or skipper is, and
how committed, even heroic, he is in combat. Synergism between man and machine is what wins battles,
not “cost-effectiveness.”272

Such sentiments continue to this day, as evidenced
by the reaction of some within the Army to Rumsfeld
and Wolfowitz’s impending decision to cancel the
Crusader. The notorious talking points sent to the Hill
from the Army’s Office of Legislative Liaison accused
Rumsfeld of scoring cheap political points at the expense of soldiers’ lives.
The preceding case studies demonstrate that certain elements are constant in the ongoing civil-military debate over “how much is enough” and what is
the most effective way to meet national security and
defense needs. Future civilian and military leaders
would do well to heed a few lessons from these cases.
Lesson 1. Perspective is everything. The Services
will invariably seek to maximize tactical and operational effectiveness. The Secretary of Defense must
look holistically at the strategy and match that against
his concerns about the budgetary constraints. The Ser-
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vices must also deal with budgetary constraints, but
can often look to other Services as sources for “fudging” the Service top-line. This is the approach the Air
Force, in particular, took in its very early days as an
independent Service after World War II.
Lesson 2. Although absolute arguments tend to
dominate debate, they rarely provide the insight and
sophistication required to make an informed decision.
Services will—as many others do—make arguments
about the absolute necessity of a weapons program,
without which future conflict will leave the United
States the loser. Air Force officers routinely cite April
1953 as the last time an American soldier was killed by
enemy fixed-wing air attack, pointing to the need for
enduring air dominance (not just superiority). Naval
officers often cite the aircraft carrier as more than four
acres of floating sovereignty, while ignoring its growing vulnerability to ballistic and cruise missile technology. These emotive, absolutist arguments have the
benefit of forcefulness and presenting a clear choice.
They are also largely useless in the modern debate over
capabilities. Dynamic, relative arguments are more
accurate in providing a supposition against which to
challenge the desires of one or the other party. It is not
enough to say one program is absolutely “good” or
“bad,” but to compare it to other systems, and more
importantly, to fix it in a larger strategic argument.
Lesson 3. The iron triangle lives, and Congress
plays a strong role. Decisions cannot be made without actively engaging the power brokers on the Hill.
Because many DoD decisions result from compromise
or forceful personalities trying to push through their
decisions, the senior leadership is often left trying to
convince a skeptical Congress of an imperfect case.
Additionally, the senior leadership has fought so
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many battles already, that sheer exhaustion and the
press of thousands of other decisions further sap energy from the crucial fight on the Hill. The Secretary
of Defense can win individual battles through force
of will (such as happened in the Crusader case), but
rarely maintain a sustained campaign. His efforts are
complicated by the strong liaison presence the military
Services keep on the Hill. The Secretary of Defense’s
legislative assistants have a tough time counteracting
this influence. Finally, congressional members vociferously protect their right to ask military officers their
professional opinions on any military issue and often
give more weight and respect to those opinions than
they give to the Department’s civilian leadership.
Lesson 4. Cost will always play a critical role. Although public political discourse often emphasizes
our willingness as a country to provide the Soldier,
Sailor, Airman, and Marine the equipment he or she
needs to fight and win, tough choices are made all
the time, and cost will carry a great deal of weight in
any discussion. Military officers may be uncomfortable with debates that center on cost-effectiveness, but
they cannot avoid it.
Lesson 5. Assumptions are critical and should be
rigorously tested and questioned. Parties to a debate
over military requirements often do not recognize the
basic critical assumptions that support their understanding of the situation. Failure to recognize these
differences and bring them out for debate means more
time spent in unresolved debate.
Lesson 6. Developing technologies often take longer to mature than originally anticipated and may
exceed the cost and schedule originally allotted. The
pursuit of the better often comes at the expense of
the good, and in the case of the Crusader may have
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resulted in its cancellation. If the Army had pursued
a less ambitious platform, arguably it would have its
new artillery piece today.
Understanding these lessons is only the start, however. Civilians and military officers should vigorously
debate military requirements. The differences in perspectives are essential to democracy and contribute to
better results in the end. That having been said, understanding the basis for each other’s point of view
can immeasurably help smooth this process, to the
benefit of all. So what is the Secretary of Defense to
do? The lessons identified above highlight that there
are no easy answers. The six lessons are dilemmas that
every Secretary of Defense faces and will continue to
face. The key is to explicitly understand these lessons
from the outset and develop decisionmaking strategies that take them into account constantly.
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has attempted
to provide the Services with full voice in decisions on
major weapons programs, while limiting the unending debates and rearguard actions to save programs.
He asked Service chiefs to sign nondisclosure agreements to get a better handle on the narrative DoD
would present to Congress on the FY2010 budget.273
As part of such agreements, the Secretary should set
limits on debate. Too often, a new Service chief will
appeal for more time to analyze an issue even though
his Service has had sufficient time as an enterprise to
analyze and debate an issue. This recommendation is
not intended to stifle or shackle Service chiefs from
doing their job and defending their service’s prerogatives; rather it is to set reasonable limits on debate in
an environment where a decision is often taken as an
invitation for more strenuous debate.

87

Decisionmaking bodies proliferate in the Pentagon: we have seen the advent of Deputy’s Advisory
Working Group (DAWG), Senior Level Review Group
(SLRGs), Senior Level Review Councils (SLRCs), Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and other
bodies with representatives from the military and civilian sides of the DoD. Some have suggested using
one of these bodies, such as the DAWG to vigorously
debate a program’s merits—perhaps with CAPE (Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation) playing the
“prosecutor” and the Service as the “defendant”—to
expose the relative merits of a program and then hold
secret balloting amongst the participants. The Deputy
Secretary would then take the results of those debates
forward to the Secretary for his final decision.274 Some
form of this idea is worth considering, but will require
a method to look more broadly than single programs,
which can look indispensible when examined in isolation.
Debates in these higher counsels should give
more relative weight to the combatant commanders,
particularly the Joint Forces Command (which is responsible for developing doctrine and concepts for
how the Joint Force will fight in the future). The combatant commanders are the ones who have to “fight
the force” and are more naturally inclined to think
jointly about the employment of forces than their
Service chief counterparts. Although the combatant
commander has a near-term focus on what it would
take to fight now and for the duration of his term, this
counterbalances the Service chief’s focus on long-term
acquisition. The role of Service secretaries needs to
be addressed as well. President Bush and Secretary
Rumsfeld sought to implement a “corporate board”
approach, but soon found their Service secretaries be-
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holden to their Services, rather than serving as brakes
on the Services’ appetites. More often, a Service secretary is chosen for his knowledge of the Service, meaning that he is much more likely to be an advocate than
an ax-man. This trend appears to be continuing under
the current administration.275 The Secretary of Defense
needs Service secretaries who can find a happy medium between advocate and ax-man; someone who will
ask the tough questions and bring a healthy dose of
skepticism, while seeking to understand the Service’s
needs and address them innovatively.
At the same time, the Secretary of Defense will continue to need civilian staff of varied talents across the
enterprise. Systems analysis as embodied in PA&E is a
useful tool, but only one of many. OSD Policy and the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) must also provide their perspectives and continue to recruit talent
from across the experience and educational spectrum.
Finally, the power brokers in Congress must be a part
of the deliberative process and not an afterthought.
Well-thought-out policies in the national interest will
inevitably run into members who will say, as Senator
Chris Dodd said following the announced closeout of
the F-22 buy, “we’ve beaten [Secretary Gates] in the
past and we’ll beat them [sic] again.”276
The DoD has seen record budgets in recent years,
but the era of war supplementals will soon end.277
As the budget declines or experiences near-zero real
growth in future years, the balancing act between recapitalization of the force and pursuing new programs
will come into sharper relief, increasing the likelihood
of increased debate between the Department’s civilian
leadership and the military over how best to invest in
future capabilities. The Secretary of Defense has the
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unenviable task of balancing these competing requirements and implementing a strategy that will have significant consequences for how the Services develop in
the future.
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